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Abstract 
[Excerpt] U.S.-China relations were remarkably smooth for much of the George W. Bush Administration, 
although there are signs that U.S. China policy now is subject to competing reassessments. State 
Department officials in 2005 unveiled what they said was a new framework for the relationship — with the 
United States willing to work cooperatively with China while encouraging Beijing to become a “responsible 
stakeholder” in the global system. U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson in December 2006 established a 
U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue with Beijing, the most senior regular dialogue yet held with China. 
But other U.S. policymakers have adopted tougher stances on issues involving China and U.S.-China 
relations. They are concerned about the impact of the PRC’s strong economic growth and a more 
assertive PRC diplomacy in the international arena; about procedures to assure the quality of Chinese 
pharmaceuticals, food, and other products being imported into the United States; and about trade 
practices and policies in China that contribute to a strong U.S.-China trade imbalance in the latter’s favor. 
Taiwan, which China considers a “renegade province,” remains the most sensitive issue the two countries 
face and the one many observers fear could lead to Sino-U.S. conflict. But U.S. relations with Taiwan have 
also been plagued by what some U.S. officials see as that government’s minimal defense spending and 
the recurrent independence-leaning actions and rhetoric of its President and other government officials, 
which U.S. officials have called “unhelpful” to regional stability. On March 11, 2008, the anniversary of a 
large-scale anti-Chinese uprising in 1959, the political status of Tibet re-emerged as an issue when monks 
in Lhasa launched a protest against PRC rule. The protests, at times apparently resulting in violent 
clashes with police, judging from news reports, have spread to several other cities in Tibet and beyond. 
Beijing’s response has led some Tibetan activists to add their voices to other calls urging a boycott of the 
Summer Olympics in Beijing in August 2008. 
Other concerns about China appear driven by security calculations in Congress and at the Pentagon, 
where officials question the motivations behind China’s expanding military budget. One congressionally 
mandated DOD report concluded Beijing is greatly understating its military expenditures and is developing 
anti-satellite (ASAT) systems — a claim that gained more credence when the PRC used a ballistic missile 
to destroy one of its own orbiting satellites in January 2007. Bilateral economic and trade issues also are 
growing matters of concern. U.S. officials and lawmakers particularly criticize China’s massive bilateral 
trade surplus, its failure to halt piracy of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR), and its continued 
constraints on currency valuation. 
This report will be updated regularly as events warrant and will track legislative initiatives involving China. 
For actions and issues in U.S.-China relations considered during the 109th Congress, see CRS Report 
RL32804, China-U.S. Relations in the 109th Congress, by Kerry Dumbaugh. 
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Summary
U.S.-China relations were remarkably smooth for much of the George W. Bush
Administration, although there are signs that U.S. China policy now is subject to
competing reassessments.  State Department officials in 2005 unveiled what they said
was a new framework for the relationship — with the United States willing to work
cooperatively with China while encouraging Beijing to become a “responsible
stakeholder” in the global system.  U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson in
December 2006 established a U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue with Beijing,
the most senior regular dialogue yet held with China.  But other U.S. policymakers
have adopted tougher stances on issues involving China and U.S.-China relations.
They are concerned about the impact of the PRC’s strong economic growth and a
more assertive PRC diplomacy in the international arena; about procedures to assure
the quality of Chinese pharmaceuticals, food, and other products being imported into
the United States; and about trade practices and policies in China that contribute to
a strong U.S.-China trade imbalance in the latter’s favor. 
Taiwan, which China considers a “renegade province,” remains the most
sensitive issue the two countries face and the one many observers fear could lead to
Sino-U.S. conflict. But U.S. relations with Taiwan have also been plagued by what
some U.S. officials see as that government’s minimal defense spending and the
recurrent independence-leaning actions and rhetoric of its President and other
government officials, which U.S. officials have called “unhelpful” to regional
stability.  On March 11, 2008, the anniversary of a large-scale anti-Chinese uprising
in 1959, the political status of Tibet re-emerged as an issue when monks in Lhasa
launched a protest against PRC rule.  The protests, at times apparently resulting in
violent clashes with police, judging from news reports,  have spread to several other
cities in Tibet and beyond.  Beijing’s response has led some Tibetan activists to add
their voices to other calls urging a boycott of the Summer Olympics in Beijing  in
August 2008.  
Other concerns about China appear driven by security calculations in Congress
and at the Pentagon, where officials question the motivations behind China’s
expanding military budget.  One congressionally mandated DOD report concluded
Beijing is greatly understating its military expenditures and is developing anti-
satellite (ASAT) systems — a claim that gained more credence when the PRC used
a ballistic missile to destroy one of its own orbiting satellites in January 2007.
Bilateral economic and trade issues also are growing matters of concern.  U.S.
officials and lawmakers particularly criticize China’s massive bilateral trade surplus,
its failure to halt piracy of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR), and its continued
constraints on currency valuation. 
This report will be updated regularly as events warrant and will track legislative
initiatives involving China.  For actions and issues in U.S.-China relations considered
during the 109th  Congress, see CRS Report RL32804, China-U.S. Relations in the
109th Congress, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
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Most Recent Developments
March 17, 2008 — China’s parliament appointed four new Vice Premiers: Li
Keqiang, Hui Liangyu, Zhang Dejiang, and Wang Qishan.
March 11, 2008 — Monks in Lhasa launched a protest against Chinese rule on
the 49th anniversary of a violent 1959 anti-Chinese uprising.  On the same day, the
U.S. State Department released its 2007 Country Report on Human Rights Practices;
while saying that China’s human rights record remained poor, the report dropped
China from its list of 10 worst offenders on human rights.
March 5, 2008 — The annual session of the PRC’s National People’s Congress
began.  (It is the 6th plenary meeting of the 1st session of the 11th NPC.)  
Background and Overview
Introduction 
U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), remarkably smooth
from 2001-2004, have shown signs of becoming somewhat more problematic again
since 2005 as some U.S. policymakers appear to be adopting tougher stances on a
number of issues.  Throughout much of the George W. Bush Administration, U.S.-
China relations were smoother than they had been at any time since the Tiananmen
Square crackdown in 1989.  The two governments resumed regular high-level visits
and exchanges of working level officials, resumed military-to-military relations,
cooperated on anti-terror initiatives, and worked closely on a multilateral effort to
restrain and eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons activities.  U.S. companies
continued to invest heavily in China, and some PRC companies began investing in
the United States.  
Despite this, thorny problems continue to be factors in the relationship,
including difficulties over China’s intentions toward and U.S. commitments to
democratic Taiwan, various disputes over China’s failure to protect U.S. intellectual
property rights, the economic advantage China gains from pegging its currency to a
basket of international currencies, and growing concerns about the quality and safety
of some exported Chinese products.  In addition, China’s accelerating rise in the
world has significant long-term implications for U.S. global power and influence.
In pursuit of its economic development agenda, China’s growing appetite for energy,
raw materials, and other resources has led it to seek an increasing number of
CRS-2
1
 In the United States only, the term “most-favored-nation” (MFN) status has been replaced
by the term “normal trading relations” (NTR) status.  
economic and energy-related agreements around the world, some of them with key
U.S. allies.  Some U.S. lawmakers have suggested that U.S. policies should be
reassessed in light of the PRC’s continued strong economic growth and more
assertive international posture.  
Background
For much of the 1990s, U.S. congressional interest in the PRC increased almost
annually. In the years after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, Members often
felt that they were neither consulted nor listened to by the Executive Branch
concerning the appropriate direction for U.S. China policy.  Without the strategic
imperative that the Soviet Union had once provided for comprehensive U.S.-China
relations, individual Members began to raise their own more narrowly focused
concerns on China policy, such as efforts on behalf of Taiwan, in favor of human
rights, or against forced sterilization and abortion.  
During the later Clinton Administration, when U.S. officials were pursuing a
“strategic partnership” with China, some Members became increasingly concerned
that the U.S. government was not thinking seriously enough about the PRC as a
longer-term challenge (at best) or threat (at worst) to U.S. interests.  Members were
particularly concerned about supporting the democratization and growing political
pluralism Taiwan had embraced since abandoning authoritarian rule in the late 1980s.
Congress in these years enacted more provisions to accommodate Taiwan’s interests,
engaged in repeated and protracted efforts to further condition or even withdraw the
PRC’s most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status, held hearings and considered
legislation targeting the PRC’s human rights violations, created two commissions to
monitor PRC developments, and imposed a host of requirements on the U.S.
government to monitor, report on, and restrict certain PRC activities.1
In late 2001, U.S.-China relations began to experience a sustained period of
unusual stability, and Congress as a whole became less vocal and less legislatively
active on China-related issues.  The reasons for this could not be attributed to any
resolution of entrenched bilateral policy differences — such as those long held over
human rights or on Taiwan’s status — for these differences still exist and are likely
to plague the relationship for the foreseeable future.  Rather, other factors and policy
trends appear to be at work.  
! The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States,
which brought about dramatic changes in global and national
priorities, including new agendas within Congress, that took priority
over other foreign policy issues, including the PRC.  U.S.-China
relations continue to be marginalized by Iraq, Iran, and other
pressing issues likely to continue through President Bush’s tenure.
! The George W. Bush Administration’s early willingness to de-
emphasize the importance of Sino-U.S. relations in American
CRS-3
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 At its 16th Party Congress (November 8-14, 2002), the PRC’s Communist Party selected
a new Party General Secretary (Hu Jintao), named a new 24-member Politburo and a new
nine-member Standing Committee, and made substantive changes to the Party constitution.
Further changes in government positions were made during the 10th meeting of the National
People’s Congress in March 2003, and in September 2004. For more on the leadership
transition, see CRS Report RL31661, China’s New Leadership Line-up:  Implications for
U.S. Policy, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
foreign policy, even while being open to substantively and
symbolically meaningful dialogue with China at most senior levels.
! A series of PRC policy preoccupations, including a wholesale
transition to a new generation of leaders  (beginning in 2001-2003);2
SARS, avian flu, and other domestic crises (beginning in 2002);
preparation for the 2008 Olympics; and more pro-active PRC foreign
policy activities around the world. 
This report addresses relevant policy questions in current U.S.-China relations,
discusses trends and key legislation in the current Congress and provides a
chronology of developments and high-level exchanges.  It will be updated as events
warrant.  Additional details on the issues discussed here are available in other CRS
products, noted throughout this report.  For background information and legislative
action preceding 2007, see CRS Report RL32804, China-U.S. Relations During the
109th Congress, by Kerry Dumbaugh.  CRS products can be found on the CRS
website at [http://www.crs.gov/].
Current Issues and Developments
Demonstrations in Tibet
March 11, 2008, marked the 49th anniversary of an anti-Chinese uprising in
Tibet in 1959 and the beginning of a series of increasing confrontations involving
Tibetans and Chinese officials.  The day before the anniversary date, a group of
Tibetan activists had set off from India to begin a march to Tibet on foot, reportedly
as a protest against China’s governance of Tibet. On March 11, 2008, Tibetan
Buddhist monks in Lhasa began protests against Chinese rule, and the Dalai Lama
commemorated the anniversary date from exile with a speech saying that the culture,
language, and customs of Tibet were fading away under PRC rule.  A protest
launched by Buddhist monks in Lhasa on March 11, 2008, expanded to other places
in Tibet over the ensuing days, escalating to clashes between Tibetan protestors and
Chinese riot police.  Conflicting reports have emerged about the extent of violence
by either protestors or security forces.  The protests and resulting Chinese crackdown
have further fueled a quietly simmering campaign to boycott the Summer Olympic
Games in Beijing in August 2008.  
CRS-4
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 On April 12, 2007, the Director of the FDA Center for Veterinary Medicine, Stephen F.
Sundlof, and other witnesses testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee’s
Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies on the scope of
the recall and the path of the FDA’s investigation. 
4
  Later, Binzhou Futian Biology Technology, another PRC company, was also implicated.
5
 See CRS Report RS22713, Health and Safety Concerns Over U.S. Imports of Chinese
Products: An Overview, by Wayne Morrison.
6
 Mattel’s recall involved toys containing lead paint and products containing small, powerful
magnets.  For details of Mattel’s recalled products, see [http://www.mattel.com/safety/us/].
7
 Based on a review of recalls listed on the USCPSC website from January 1 — August 17,
2007,  products manufactured in China were the most frequently subjects of recall notices,
(continued...)
Concerns about Product Safety 
In spring of 2007, reports of tainted, mislabeled, and outright fraudulent
imported consumer products from China began to raise serious questions about the
safety of U.S. imported products from other countries, the effectiveness of current
U.S. product safety inspection regimes, and the vulnerability of the U.S. food supply
to accidental contamination or deliberate tampering.  More specifically, the issue has
highlighted growing concerns, born during the SARS crisis of 2002-2003, about
potential threats to the global health system posed by the PRC’s limited food and
pharmaceutical safety standards, poor industry and product quality control, and lack
of transparency.  
Initial questions about the safety of imported products from China surfaced in
March and April 2007, when an investigation by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) linked tainted exports of pet food with wheat gluten from
China to reports of pet deaths from kidney failure in the United States.  The Canadian
company that had imported the product, Menu Foods, initiated a massive recall of its
products on March 16, 2007, and the recall effort later expanded to more brands of
pet foods and other pet food manufacturers.3  On April 3, 2007, the FDA began
halting imports of wheat gluten from a PRC company, the Xuzhou Anying Biologic
Technology Development Co. Ltd., saying it had tested positive for the tainted wheat
gluten.4  Although the PRC government initially denied its pet food products were
tainted, it later reversed that position, admitting on April 26, 2007, that PRC
companies had exported melamine-laced wheat gluten to the United States.5 
The pet food contamination was the beginning of a series of well publicized
recalls of PRC imported products including fish, tires, toothpaste, and toys.  Two of
these — Menu Foods pet food recall and Mattel’s voluntary recall of over 18 million
toys, announced on August 14, 2007 — have been reported on most widely.6   But
by August 17, 2007, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) had
issued nearly 150 recall notices in 2007 for Chinese-manufactured products,
including electric throws; ceramic heaters; folding recliner chairs; children’s jewelry;
kayak paddle floats; baby cribs; candles; oil-filled electric heaters; boom boxes;
bicycles; clothing; gas lighters; remote controls; lamps; curling irons; and hair
dryers.7
CRS-5
7
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at 147; products manufactured in the United States were the second most frequently cited,
at 41.
8
 A report citing China’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and
Quarantine.  Lee, Don, and Goldman, Abigail, “Plant linked to pet deaths had history of
polluting,”  Los Angeles Times, May 9, 2007, p. C-1.
9
 The full text of China’s new white paper on food quality and safety can be found at
[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08/17/content_6553424.htm].
Bilateral efforts on the quality of Chinese exports to the United States have been
underway for several years. In 2004, the CPSC and China’s General Administration
of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine (AQSIQ) signed a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) to cooperate on increasing the public safety of specific
consumer products, including clothing, toys, cigarette and multipurpose lighters,
home appliances, hazardous chemical consumer products, and bicycle helmets.  The
two agencies held a Consumer Product Safety Summit (CPSS) in Beijing in 2005,
and a second CPSS meeting in Washington on September 11, 2007. 
Leaders in Beijing appear concerned about the implications that recent recalls
may have for international wariness about PRC products.  Since late April 2007,
China has announced a ban on melamine in food products, initiated nation-wide
inspections of wheat gluten, and (on May 11, 2007) arrested an official from one of
the companies for falsifying the labeling on exported products to evade inspection.8
On July 10, 2007, Beijing announced it had executed the former official in charge of
the State Food and Drug Administration for accepting bribes to approve tainted or
fraudulent products.  On August 15, 2007, officials at the Chinese Embassy in
Washington, DC, held a rare news conference, defending the overall quality of
Chinese products and stating that China would be enhancing significantly its
inspection regime of toys and food being exported to the United States.  On August
17, 2007, Beijing took two further actions: the PRC State Council Information Office
released the government’s first report on food quality and safety regimes, “The
Quality and Safety of Food in China”; and Beijing appointed Vice Premier Wu Yi to
head a new Cabinet-level panel charged with ensuring product quality and food
safety.9
Military and National Security Issues 
For some years, U.S. officials in the executive branch and in Congress have
continued to voice both private and public concerns about China’s expanding
military budget and issues potentially involving U.S. national security.  U.S. security
concerns include the ultimate focus of China’s military build-up;  lack of PRC
military transparency; recurring instances of apparent PRC attempts to gain U.S.
military secrets; evidence of improving PRC military and technological prowess; and
PRC military and technological assistance to rogue states and other international bad
actors.
China’s Growing Military Power.  In its annual, congressionally mandated
report on China’s Military Power (most recently released in May 2007) the Pentagon
CRS-6
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 Statement by State Department spokesman Sean McCormack, March 8, 2007.  
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 Broad, William J., “Orbiting junk, once a nuisance, is now a threat,” New York Times,
February 6, 2007, p. 1.
concluded that China is greatly improving its military, including the number and
capabilities of its nuclear forces.  U.S. military planners and other American military
specialists maintain that PRC improvements appear largely focused on a Taiwan
contingency and on strategies to “deny access” to the military forces of a third party
 — most probably the United States — in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.  The
report maintains that  this build-up poses a long-term threat to Taiwan and ultimately
to the U.S. military presence in Asia. 
In March 2007, after Beijing announced that its military budget would increase
during the year by nearly 18%, U.S. officials called China’s military build-up a
continuing “source of concern and interest” for the world, and urged PRC leaders to
address these concerns by adopting greater transparency in military matters.10   U.S.
military planners remain concerned that at least some and perhaps much of China’s
military build-up is being driven by Beijing’s preparations to enforce its sovereignty
claims against the island of Taiwan. (Appendix II of this paper contains a list,
legislative authority, and text links for selected mandated U.S. government reports
on China, including the report on China’s Military Power.)   
PRC Anti-Satellite Test and Space Activities.   On January 11, 2007, the
PRC carried out its first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test by destroying one of its
moribund orbiting weather satellites with a ballistic missile fired from the ground.
Previously, only the United States and the Soviet Union had conducted successful
ASAT tests — tests both countries reportedly halted more than 20 years ago because
of resulting space debris that could endanger other orbiting satellites.  U.S. officials
reportedly received no advance notice from Beijing, nor did Chinese officials
publicly confirm the ASAT test until January 24, 2006, 13 days after the event and
almost a week after the U.S. Government had publicly revealed the PRC test on
January 18, 2007.  
The January PRC ASAT test and the lack of advance notification to U.S.
officials by Beijing has raised a number of concerns for U.S. policy.  Chief among
these are questions about the new potential vulnerability of U.S. satellites — crucial
for both U.S. military operations and a wide range of civilian communications
applications — and the credibility of PRC assertions that it is committed to the
peaceful use of space.  
In addition, officials from the United States and other countries have criticized
China for either ignoring or failing to realize the extent of the test’s contributions to
the growing problem of space debris.  According to space science experts, the extent
of space debris now orbiting the earth, which is already calculated at about 10,000
detectable items, poses an increasing hazard to hundreds of the world’s operational
satellites, any of which could be destroyed upon collision with a piece of space
“junk.”11  Beijing, which hosted the annual meeting of the Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee from April 23-26, 2007, itself became a significant
contributor to the space debris problem with its January 2007 ASAT test.   According
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to a State Department spokesman, the United States is reevaluating its nascent civil
space cooperation with China (initiated during the meeting of Presidents George
Bush and Hu Jintao in April 2006) in light of the January ASAT test.12  
China’s ASAT test is illustrative of the country’s ambitious and growing space
program.  China is now only the third country, after Russia and the United States, to
send  manned flights into space — the first on October 15, 2003 (Shenzhou 5), with
a single astronaut orbiting the earth, and the second on October 11, 2005 (Shenzhou
6), orbiting two astronauts.13  According to press reports from Beijing, China plans
to launch its third manned flight with three astronauts (Shenzhou 7) in September
2008 after the 2008 Olympic Games.   This mission reportedly will include a planned
space walk.  Meanwhile, China’s space plans include a three-stage lunar program, to
include landing a rover on the moon by 2012 and launching a manned lunar mission
by 2020.  China completed the first of the three stages on October 24, 2007,
launching its first unmanned lunar probe, the Chang’e 1 orbiter, aboard a Long
March 3A rocket.  
Denials of U.S. Port Calls in Hong Kong.   On November 20, 2007, the
PRC government began to deny a series of requests by U.S. military ships and
aircraft to visit or take refuge in the port of Hong Kong — a series of decisions
revealed piecemeal over the course of a week or so.  The first denial was to two U.S.
minesweepers, the Patriot and the Guardian, that reportedly requested refuge in Hong
Kong harbor on November 20 from a storm at sea.  U.S. Navy officials described
Beijing’s refusal to offer safe harbor to ships in trouble at sea as the most troubling
of the port call refusals.  Admiral Timothy Keating said of it: “That is behavior that
we do not consider consonant with a nation who advocates a peaceful rise and
harmonious relations.”14
The November 20 denial was followed on November 21 by the denial of a port
visit to the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier strike group for a Thanksgiving reunion
with family.  This denial just as unexpectedly was reversed the following day but,
according to the U.S. Navy, only after the Kitty Hawk had left Hong Kong waters to
return to its home port in Japan.  At the same time, Beijing also denied the request
for a New Year’s holiday port visit by a U.S. Navy frigate, the Reuben James.  Navy
officials later also said that the PRC also had denied landing rights to a C-17 U.S. Air
Force cargo plane scheduled to make its quarterly re-supply run to the U.S. Consulate
in Hong Kong.15  
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The port visit denials caught U.S. military officials by surprise and produced
mixed and confusing responses from PRC officials.  Some speculated that ship visits
were denied to signal opposition to U.S. policy on Taiwan — particularly U.S. arms
sales, as the port call denials coincided with publication of a U.S. announcement of
a proposed arms sale to Taiwan for upgrade and refurbishment of PATRIOT
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Guided Missiles.16   More than a week later, Chinese
officials later also mentioned the U.S. decision to award a congressional gold medal
to the Dalai Lama Beijing as one of the “difficulties” in U.S.-China relations, but did
not specifically link the port call denials with either the award or U.S. arms sales.17
There was additional speculation that the port call denials may have been linked
to unannounced, large-scale military exercises reportedly being held by the East and
South China fleets from November 16 - 23, 2007.18  Media in Hong Kong reported
that the military maneuvers resulted in air restrictions in southern China that caused
significant delays for airline passengers in the region.19  According to one account,
the PRC ships conducting the exercises may have had a “chance encounter” with the
USS Kitty Hawk carrier strike group as it was headed to Hong Kong.20  
Military Contacts.  Once one of the stronger components of the relationship,
U.S.-China military relations have never fully recovered after they were suspended
following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.  Nevertheless, both countries
cautiously resumed military contacts during the 108th Congress, although efforts to
reenergize military ties met with repeated setbacks, with U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld making his first official visit to China as Secretary of Defense only
in October 2005.21  
Under U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, U.S.-China military ties appear
to have been more active.  On November 4, 2007, Secretary Gates arrived in Beijing
for a three-day visit, his first official visit to China as Secretary of Defense.  He met
with his counterpart, Defense Secretary Cao Cangchuan, with Central Military
Commission Vice-Chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, and with Vice Foreign
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Minister Dai Bingguo.  Both sides announced they had reached agreement on setting
up an official military hotline; strengthening dialogue and exchanges, particularly
between young and middle-aged military officers; and holding exercises on
humanitarian rescue and disaster relief.  Admiral Timothy J. Keating, commander of
U.S. forces in the Pacific, also left for a visit to Beijing on January 12, 2008.  (See
appendix at the end of this report for a list of recent U.S.-China official visits.) 
Economic and Trade Issues22
Economic and trade issues are a growing source of contention in U.S.-China
relations in 2007.  The PRC is now the second-largest U.S. trading partner, with total
U.S.-China trade in 2006 at $343 billion.  Ongoing issues in U.S.-China economic
relations include the substantial and growing U.S. trade deficit with China (an
estimated $232 billion in 2006), repeated PRC inabilities to protect U.S. intellectual
property rights, and the PRC’s continuing restrictive trade practices, such as its
unwillingness to date to float its currency.   (Issues involving allegations about
tainted or faulty PRC exports to the United States are dealt with earlier in this report.)
In addition, some U.S. policymakers have focused attention in recent years on efforts
by PRC companies to buy American assets.
Currency Valuation.  On June 13, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department
released a mandated, semi-annual report to Congress on international exchange rates
in which it concluded that China “did not meet the technical requirements for
designation” [as a currency manipulator] under U.S. law, but declaring that the
United States “forcefully” raises the currency valuation issue with PRC leaders at
every opportunity.23  The report also concluded that China’s economy was “severely”
unbalanced — overly dependent on exports and with weak consumer spending and
at home.  The Treasury report prompted renewed calls and legislation in Congress for
firmer U.S. action to mitigate the effects of China’s currency restrictions.  
The U.S. concern about the PRC’s decision to keep the value of its currency low
with respect to the dollar, and indirectly with the yen and euro, has been building for
several years.  Until 2005, the PRC pegged its currency, the renminbi (RMB), to the
U.S. dollar at a rate of about 8.3 RMB to the dollar — a valuation that many U.S.
policymakers concluded kept the PRC’s currency artificially undervalued, making
PRC exports artificially cheap and making it harder for U.S. producers to compete.
U.S. critics of the PRC’s currency peg charged that the PRC unfairly manipulated its
currency, and they have urged Beijing either to raise the RMB’s value or to make it
freely convertible subject to market forces. On July 1, 2005, the PRC changed this
valuation method, instead announcing it would peg the RMB to a basket of
currencies.  
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The resulting small appreciations in the RMB from this action have not been
sufficient to assuage ongoing U.S. congressional concerns.24  Since August 1, 2007,
both the Senate Finance Committee and the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Committee have reported legislation addressing currency exchange rate
issues.25 
Unfair Trade Subsidies.  On March 20, 2007, the U.S. Department of
Commerce announced a preliminary decision to apply countervailing duties (an anti-
subsidy remedy) to two PRC companies exporting “coated free sheet” (glossy)  paper
to the United States.  The announcement broke with a 23-year U.S. policy, adopted
in 1984, of not applying U.S. countervailing duty laws to non-market economies.
Citing a 177% increase in imports of PRC glossy paper products from 2005-2006,
Secretary of Commerce Carlos M. Gutierrez said that the PRC economy had evolved
significantly in the last two decades and that U.S. tools to address unfair competition
needed to evolve in response.  
The move signals a new U.S. willingness to be assertive in challenging PRC
trade policies and suggests that other American industries affected by the PRC’s
exports, such as textile, steel, and plastics, may soon be seeking similar remedies.
Beijing’s sharp criticism of the U.S. move hints at potential trade retaliation and has
possible negative implications for the ongoing U.S.-China “Senior Dialogue” being
chaired by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson.  
Intellectual Property Rights.  China’s inability to live up to its World Trade
Organization (WTO) commitments to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) has
become one of the most important issues in U.S.-China bilateral trade.  According
to calculations from U.S. industry sources, IPR piracy has cost U.S. firms $2.5 billion
in lost sales, and the IPR piracy rate in China for U.S. products is estimated at around
90%.26  U.S. officials routinely have urged Beijing to crack down on IPR piracy, and
a series of U.S. officials visiting China have stressed that China needs to do better at
IPR protection. 
North Korea
Progress on dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program continues to
be elusive.  After months of apparent forward movement, the Chinese government
on September 16, 2007, informed the U.S. Government that a meeting among all
parties, scheduled for mid-September 2007,  had been abruptly cancelled.  Some have
speculated that the cancellation had to do with reportedly new intelligence, leaked the
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previous week, that North Korea may be engaged in nuclear cooperation with Syria.27
On December 14, 2007, the White House confirmed that it had received a verbal
reply from North Korea to a letter sent by President Bush the previous week urging
the country to adhere to its denuclearization commitments.  A White House
spokesman offered no details on the reply’s contents.28
Six Party Talks.  After months of continuing stalemate in 2006 in the
frequently problematic Six-Party Talks, optimism for a deal warmed after February
13, 2007, when the six parties to the talks signed a document, the “Initial Actions for
the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” designed to begin implementing the joint
statement issued in September 2005. Under that agreement, North Korea is to
dismantle its nuclear weapons program and permit international inspections to
resume in exchange for a package of incentives, including food and energy assistance
and the transfer back of $25 million in North Korean-linked funds that were frozen
by the Banco Delta Asia, located in Macau, in September 2005.29  
With the Macau funds having been transferred, the North Korean nuclear reactor
at Yongbyon confirmed as shut down, and International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) inspectors present in North Korea again as of July 14, 2007, the next stage
of the February agreement calls for Pyongyang to declare all its nuclear programs and
disable all its existing nuclear facilities.  Six-Party Talks began again on July 19,
2007, ostensibly to discuss permanently disabling the closed Yongbyon reactor and
full disclosure by North Korea of its nuclear research and weapons development
programs.  After three days, talks concluded with no agreement on a schedule for
North Korea’s nuclear disarmament, although U.S. chief envoy Christopher Hill
subsequently has appeared cautiously optimistic on further progress.30   The next
round of the Six-Party talks were to take place in September 2007.  (As stated above,
it is this round of talks that was abruptly cancelled on September 16, 2007.)  
PRC officials repeatedly have emphasized that China supports a non-nuclear
Korean peninsula.  This support is thought to be genuine, since an unpredictable
North Korea armed with nuclear weapons could have unpleasant consequences for
Beijing — such as the creation of nuclear weapons programs in currently non-nuclear
neighbors like Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, or an accelerated U.S. commitment
for a regional missile defense program, to name only two.  But a common U.S. view
has been that Beijing has not exerted enough direct pressure on North Korea, and is
in fact continuing to prop up the North Korean regime with supplies of food and fuel
and to advocate bilateral U.S.-North Korean dialogue.  According to other views,
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PRC officials primarily exert political pressure on North Korea, preferring to avoid
economic pressure that they judge could lead to instability in North Korea.31
October 2006 Nuclear Test.  Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons test on October
9, 2006, posed new challenges for PRC policy goals in Asia, on the Korean
peninsula, and with the United States.  Proponents of the view that China is sincere
in its desire to prevent nuclearization of the Korean peninsula saw Pyongyang’s
October test as a blatant disregard for PRC views and interests, a signal that Beijing
has little leverage with Pyongyang, and a serious challenge to PRC standing as a
credible interlocutor on the North Korean issue. The test was preceded several
months earlier by a series of missile launches that North Korea conducted on July 4,
2006, an event that elevated the North Korean issue to an even more prominent
position in the U.S. political agenda with China. 
The evolving PRC reaction after the October 9th test appears to encapsulate the
conflicting political and strategic motivations thought to affect China’s
policymaking on North Korea.  Beijing’s initial reaction was unprecedentedly harsh,
and initial speculation in the press and by some American experts was that the PRC
now would be forced to become more coercive in its North Korea policy.32   A
statement released on October 9, 2006 by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
strongly criticized the North Korean action as a “stubbornly defiant” disregard of the
international community’s and China’s “firm, unshakeable, and consistent”
opposition to Pyongyang’s nuclear program.33  The statement went on to say that
China “strongly demands that the DPRK side abide by its commitment to non-
nuclearization.”  According to a Foreign Ministry spokesman, the October 9th test had
“a negative impact” on Sino-North Korean relations.34   Some news accounts
maintained that after the nuclear test the PRC began augmenting its military forces
along the Sino-North Korean border and erecting barbed-wire fences along some
stretches of the border.35
But by other measures, Beijing’s resolve has appeared to be fluctuating.  Within
days of the North Korean October 9th test, PRC spokesmen  were emphasizing that
China was committed to maintaining friendly and cooperative ties with North Korea,
and that Beijing’s goal was not to exact “punishment” on North Korea but to take
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“appropriate and moderate” measures to further negotiations.36  On October 14, 2006,
China voted to support a U.N. resolution condemning North Korea’s nuclear test,
including sanctions prohibiting sales of military systems or luxury goods to North
Korea and an immediate freeze of North Korean financial assets.37  After the U.N.
vote, China said it would not participate in inspections of North Korean cargo
transiting its borders out of fear such inspections would lead to conflict, then reversed
that position within days after heavy pressure from the United States.  Subsequent
press reports stated that Chinese banks began blocking financial transactions with
North Korea,38 and that Chinese officials were prepared to reduce oil shipments and
take other actions if North Korea refused to return to the Six Party Talks.39
U.S.-PRC Official Dialogues
The Senior Dialogue and Strategic Economic Dialogue. In recent
years, two new high-level U.S.-China dialogues have been formed:  the U.S.-China
Senior Dialogue under the auspices of the State Department, and the U.S.-China
Strategic Economic Dialogue under the auspices of the Treasury Department.  Each
of these is intended to meet twice annually so that Cabinet-level officials in both
parties can hold regular talks on key issues.  In Beijing in August 2005, Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick and PRC Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo
presided over the initial round of the Senior Dialogue, which was first suggested by
PRC President Hu Jintao in 2004 during a meeting with President Bush.  On January
17, 2008, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and PRC Vice Foreign
Minister Dai Bingguo presided jointly over the fifth round of the Strategic Dialogue
in Beijing.  Negroponte reportedly reiterated the U.S. position on Taiwan’s U.N.
referendum.  For the first time, a PRC military official, General Ding Jingong,
attended the dialogue.  Ding is deputy head of the Foreign Affairs Office of the
Ministry of Defense.  
On September 20, 2006, during the first of his trips to China as Treasury
Secretary, Henry Paulson announced that he would chair a new senior-level
mechanism for bilateral dialogue agreed to by Presidents Bush and Hu, the U.S.-
China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), which like the Senior Dialogue would
be held twice annually.40  According to a background paper from the SED, the
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purpose of the SED is to advance U.S.-China economic relations and encourage
China’s continued economic transition to that of a responsible global player.41
In the first SED meeting, held December 14-15, 2006, six U.S. Cabinet officers
and other senior U.S. officials visited Beijing to promote increased access for U.S.
exports and better U.S.-China trade ties.42   The second SED round, held in
Washington on May 22-23, 2007, was attended by 17 U.S. cabinet officials and
agency heads and by 15 PRC ministers and representatives from 21 PRC government
ministries and agencies.43  According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the second
meeting resulted in agreements to provide greater access in China to U.S. goods and
services, including in the financial sector;  cooperate further in promoting energy
security and environmental protection; and strengthen the PRC’s enforcement of
intellectual property rights laws.  The third SED meeting, held for three days in China
beginning December 11, 2007, produced new U.S.-China agreements on food and
product safety, energy, and the environment, but made no progress on currency
valuation or other economic issues of primary concern to Congress.  
The Senior Dialogue and the SED join a host of other regularly occurring
official U.S.-China dialogues that hold regular meetings, generally on either an
annual or biannual basis.  These include the following:
! The Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), initiated
in 1983 and elevated in 2003 to a senior level.  Participating
agencies are the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Trade
Representative, and the PRC Vice Premier responsible for trade. The
18th session was held in Beijing in December 2007.  
! The U.S.-China Joint Economic Committee (JEC), initiated in
1979.  Participating agencies are the U.S. Department of the
Treasury and the PRC Ministry of Finance. 
! The U.S.-China Joint Commission on Science and Technology
(JCM), initiated in 1979.  Participating agencies are the Office of
Science and Technology Policy (White House), the State
Department’s Office of Science and Technology Cooperation, and
the PRC Ministry of Science and Technology. 
! The U.S.-China Economic Development and Reform Dialogue
(State-NDRC Dialogue), initiated in 2003.  Participating agencies
are the U.S. Department of State and the PRC National
Development and Reform Commission.  
! The U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue (EPD), negotiated in 2004
and initiated in 2005.  Participating agencies are the U.S.
CRS-15
44
 See CRS Report RL32496, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, by Shirley
Kan.
45
 Scott Tyson, Ann, “Admiral tries to revive Chinese ties,” Washington Post, September 23,
2006, p. A14.
46
 For an analysis of current problems and challenges for U.S. policy toward Taiwan, see
CRS Report RL33684, Underlying Strains in Taiwan-U.S. Political Relations, by Kerry
Dumbaugh.
Department of Energy and China’s National Development and
Reform Commission.  
! The Global Issues Forum (GIF), negotiated in 2004 and initiated
in 2005.  Participating agencies include the U.S. Department of
State’s Bureau for Global Affairs  and the PRC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.  
! The U.S.-China Healthcare Forum (HCF), initiated in July 2005.
Participating agencies are the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
Department of Health and Human Services;  and the PRC Ministry
of Health and Ministry of Commerce.  
! The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate (AP6), announced in 2005 and initiated in 2006.  The
forum brings together China, the United States, Australia, India,
Japan, and Korea. 
Notably absent from the regularized U.S.-China dialogue process is an official
U.S.-China military or defense dialogue at a comparable level of intensity or public
scrutiny. The mechanism that does exist, the Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) —
intermittent and plagued with recurring setbacks — has been of dubious value for a
number of reasons.44  Admiral William Fallon, attempting to revitalize U.S.-China
military ties as Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, was quoted in 2006 as
saying that there had been so much decline in U.S.-China military ties in recent years
that he was “starting from virtually zero” in trying to rebuild contacts.45  As noted
earlier in this report, the tempo of senior level U.S.-China military contacts appears
to be running higher under U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, with at least 6
senior U.S. military officials having made the trip to Beijing since March 2007.  (See
Appendix I for senior U.S.-China official visits.)  
Taiwan
Taiwan remains the most sensitive and complex issue that U.S. policymakers
face in bilateral Sino-U.S. relations.46  It is the issue that many observers most fear
could lead to potential U.S.-China conflict. Beijing continues to lay sovereign claim
to Taiwan and vows that one day Taiwan will be reunified with China either
peacefully or by force.  Beijing has long maintained that it has the option to use force
should Taiwan declare independence from China.  Chinese leaders are supporting
these long-standing claims with more than 700 missiles deployed opposite Taiwan’s
coast and with a program of military modernization and training that defense
specialists believe is based on a “Taiwan scenario.”  Still, Beijing’s rhetoric and
position on Taiwan are seen to have become somewhat less forceful since China’s
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passage of an anti-secession law in March 2005 aimed at Taiwan independence
activists. 
China watchers remain especially concerned because of Taiwan’s unpredictable
political environment, where the balance of political power has teetered precipitously
between two contending political party coalitions.  One of these — the “Pan-Green”
coalition led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has controlled the
presidency for eight years and is closely associated with advocates of Taiwan
independence.  The other, “Pan-Blue” party coalition, led by the remnants of the
once-dominant Nationalist Party (KMT), has advocated greater policy caution and
more engagement with the PRC.  
But on January 12, 2008, Taiwan held legislative elections under new electoral
rules that effectively wiped out the two largest party’s coalition partners and suggests
the end, at least temporarily, of Pan-Blue/Pan-Green coalition politics in Taiwan.
The 2005 electoral changes halved the size of the legislature to 113 members from
its former size of 225 and increased the term of office from three years to four.  The
new rules also instituted a new single-member district system employing two ballots
for voters, similar to systems used in Germany and Japan: one to be cast for a
candidate and one to be cast for a political party.  
As expected, the new system has appeared to favor larger, well-organized
parties and to put smaller parties and fringe elements at a disadvantage.  The KMT
emerged with a solid controlling majority of 81 seats against the ruling DPP’s anemic
27 seats.  Five seats were gained by independent and smaller party candidates, all of
whom are expected to side with KMT positions.  While a KMT legislative victory
was expected under the new electoral rules, the wide margin surprised most analysts
and dealt a serious blow to DPP aspirations to be victorious in the March 22, 2008
presidential election.  President Chen Shui-bian stepped down as head of the DPP
party, saying he took full responsibility for his party’s loss.  He is term-limited as
Taiwan’s president and will be stepping down in May 2008.  
Referendum on U.N. Membership for Taiwan.  After years of
unsuccessful attempts to win observer status in the United Nations and its affiliate
bodies, particularly the World Health Organization (WHO), Taiwan in 2007 changed
tactics and submitted an application for full membership under its formal name, the
“Republic of China.”  This effort in the WHO failed.47  By late May 2007, Taiwan’s
President Chen began to argue that Taiwan should apply to U.N. agencies under the
name “Taiwan,” and on June 18, 2007, Chen announced that he would hold an
island-wide referendum on this subject in conjunction with Taiwan’s presidential
elections in March 2008.  Even so, the Taiwan government independently has taken
a number of steps in pursuit of full U.N. membership under the name “Taiwan.”
Taipei has submitted several letters of application to the U.N. (July 19, 2007 and July
31, 2007), which were returned on the grounds that such an action would violate the
U.N.’s “one China” policy.  And for the 15th consecutive year, on September 19,
2007, a committee of the General Assembly decided not to include Taiwan’s
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application for U.N. membership on the agenda of the (62nd) General Assembly
meeting.  
Taiwan’s potential participation in the United Nations is controversial, and
vigorously opposed by China, because it suggests that Taiwan is a sovereign state
separate from the mainland.  The U.S. government is on record as supporting
Taiwan’s membership in organizations “where state-hood is not an issue.”48  In one
of many statements over the years on this subject, a State Department spokesman on
June 19, 2007, reacted to President Chen’s U.N. referendum announcement by
saying, “We do not support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that
require statehood [for membership]....This would include a referendum on whether
or apply to the United Nations under ‘Taiwan’.”49  
Beijing argues that since Taiwan is not a state but a part of China it cannot be
separately admitted to U.N. entities for which sovereign status is a pre-requisite for
membership.  Always opposed to Taiwan’s U.N. bids, Beijing appears to view the
2007 applications and the referendum being discussed in Taiwan for 2008 as
especially threatening.  A spokesman from China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said on
September 16, 2007, that Beijing had “made necessary preparations” to “deal with
serious conditions” as a result of Taiwan’s UN membership bid.  No details were
provided on what “necessary preparations” involved.  
For its part, Taiwan in the past has maintained that its “observer status” in U.N.
bodies such as WHO would be an apolitical solution since other non-sovereign
entities, like the Holy See and the Palestine Liberation Organization, have been given
such status.  In 2004, the 108th Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 108-28) requiring
the Secretary of State to seek Taiwan’s observer status in WHO at every annual
WHA meeting.50   
U.S. Taiwan Policy and U.S. Arms Sales.   Given Taiwan-PRC tensions
and U.S. defense interests in Taiwan, many U.S. policymakers have grown frustrated
with Taiwan’s falling military expenditures and its perceived decline in defense
readiness. Political disagreements in Taiwan also have kept the government from
purchasing much of the weaponry President Bush approved for sale in 2001.  Until
2007, these disagreements stalled a special arms acquisition budget that the
government submitted to Taiwan’s legislature, originally for $18 billion, then slashed
to $15 billion and finally to $6.3 billion in an effort to attract legislative support.  The
$6.3 billion compromise arms budget package was blocked again by the Taiwan
opposition coalition on October 24, 2006.  The Director of the U.S. American
Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Steve Young, held a press conference in Taipei on October
26, 2006, issuing a stern warning to Taiwan legislators about the move, saying “The
United States is watching closely and will judge those who take responsible positions
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on this as well as those who play politics.”51  Other U.S. officials also appeared
frustrated with delays over the special arms budget and raised questions about future
U.S. defense commitments to Taiwan if the delays continue.52
On June 15, 2007, Taiwan’s legislature passed a 2007 defense budget which
included funds for portions of the 2001 U.S. weapons package.  In addition to funds
($6 million) for a feasibility study for diesel submarines, the budget included funds
for P3-C anti-submarine warfare aircraft.  The Bush Administration notified
Congress on September 12, 2007 of the proposed sale to Taiwan of 12 excess P3-C
planes;53 on November 20, 2007, the Federal Register published the announcement
of another proposed arms sale to Taiwan for upgrade and refurbishment of PATRIOT
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Guided Missiles.54   
Official Taiwan-PRC Contacts.  Official government-to-government talks
between China and Taiwan last occurred in October 1998, when Koo Chen-fu,
Chairman of Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Wang Daohan,
president of the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
(ARATS), held meetings in Shanghai.55  But while official talks have flagged,
indirect ties and unofficial contacts have continued and have seen significant recent
breakthroughs.  Taiwan businesses are increasingly invested across the strait,
although the exact figures remain unclear.  Taiwan-China trade has also increased
dramatically over the past decade, so that China now has surpassed the United States
as Taiwan’s most important trading partner.  According to China’s official news
agency, Taiwan’s total bilateral trade with the PRC is likely to be more than
U.S.$110 billion in 2007 — a 13% increase over 2006.56 
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This increasing economic interconnectedness with the PRC has put pressure on
Taiwan’s DPP government to accommodate further the Taiwan business community
by easing restrictions on direct travel and investment to the PRC.  On January 16,
2007, Taiwan and China announced that 96 non-stop, round-trip charter flights would
be authorized between the two land masses during the upcoming Lunar New Year
from February 13-26, 2007.  In 2007, 48 flights were permitted for each side as
opposed to 36 for each side in 2006.  Destinations in 2007 include Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou, and Xiamen in the PRC, and Taoyuan and Kaohsiung in Taiwan.  Such
cross-strait accommodations remain worrisome to the DPP’s pro-independence
political base in Taiwan, who believe that further economic ties to the mainland will
erode Taiwan’s autonomy and lead to a “hollowing out” of Taiwan’s industrial
base.57  Thus, each Taiwan government decision to facilitate economic and
transportation links with the PRC represents an uneasy political compromise.  
China’s Growing Global Reach 
Many observers now focus on the critical implications China’s economic growth
and increasing international engagement could have for U.S. economic and strategic
interests.  To feed its voracious appetite for resources, capital, and technology, China
has steadily and successfully sought trade agreements, oil and gas contracts, scientific
and technological cooperation, and multilateral security arrangements with countries
both around its periphery and around the world.  Dubbed the “charm offensive” by
some observers, China’s growing international economic engagement has gone hand-
in-hand with expanding political influence.  Although some believe that PRC
officials appear more comfortable working with undemocratic or authoritarian
governments, PRC outreach also has extended to key U.S. allies or to regions where
U.S. dominance to date has been unparalleled and unquestioned.  A brief survey of
China’s recent international engagement hints at the potential for increasing Sino-
U.S. competition for resources, power, and influence around the world.  
Asia.  China’s improved relationships with its regional neighbors are
particularly visible.  In 2005, China took part in the first East Asia Summit (EAS),
a fledgling grouping of 16 Asian and Pacific powers including China, the ten
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, South
Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand, but excluding the United States.58
Russia’s President Putin attended as an invited observer.59  The second EAS meeting,
hosted by the Philippines, began on January 15, 2007.  The 16 nations reached new
agreements to facilitate the eventual formation of a free-trade bloc and in addition
signed the Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security, pledging cooperation
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on developing renewable energy supplies and promoting cuts in greenhouse gas
emissions.60
For decades prior to the mid-1990s, Sino-ASEAN relations were characterized
by recurring clashes over territorial disputes, diplomatic deadlocks, and ASEAN
concerns about China’s military ambitions and regional economic competitiveness.61
The 2005 EAS meeting is part of a trend in growing Sino-ASEAN regional
cooperation.  In addition to being included in an economic partnership in the ASEAN
Plus Three (APT) grouping (including also Japan and South Korea, two U.S. military
allies), China signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN in November 2004.  Under
the agreement, beginning July 1, 2005, the parties started lowering or cancelling
tariffs on 7,000 items, with the goal of reaching full mutual free trade by 2010.
Largely as a result of this, Sino-ASEAN two-way trade increased to more than $160
billion in 2006, up 23% from 2005.  On January 14, 2007, China and ASEAN signed
a new trade agreement on services, considered a major step toward eventual
completion of a Sino-ASEAN free trade agreement.62 
Within ASEAN, China’s relations with  Burma are unique, as Beijing has
provided Rangoon with substantial military, economic, and infrastructure
development assistance.  According to a reported internal Department of Defense
(DOD) document, Beijing is building naval bases in Burma that will give China its
only access to the Indian Ocean.63  These close relations are one explanation the PRC
on January 12, 2007, vetoed a U.S.-sponsored U.N. Security Council resolution
criticizing Burma’s human rights record.64  On the question of Burma’s Buddhist
monk protests, China has been reluctant to support U.N. sanctions against the
Burmese junta, stating that the matter is one for “the Myanmar [Burma] government
and people to solve....”65 
China has also improved its bilateral relationship with India, with which it
fought several border wars in the 1960s, and with Central Asia.  On January 24,
2005, China and India began a “strategic dialogue,” discussing terrorism, resource
competition, and the U.S. role in Asia.66  The two countries have named 2007 as the
“China-India year of friendship through tourism,” and the China National Tourism
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Administration (CNTA) opened an office in New Delhi on August 20, 2007.  With
the Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union, China has pursued both
economic and security arrangements through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), founded in 2001.67  Within the SCO context, China has cooperated on border
enforcement, signed pipeline and rail link agreements, and conducted joint military
maneuvers.  China also has negotiated energy deals with Australia, another U.S.
regional ally, to supply liquid natural gas to southern China, and is continuing to
explore a Sino-Australian free trade agreement.  China’s growing regional and global
importance to Australia has generated a backlash there against what is perceived as
an increasingly hard-line U.S. policy stance toward China.68
Japan.  Japan, considered the most important American ally in Asia, has been
an exception to China’s regional diplomatic achievements.  China routinely protested
former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine,
where war criminals are also enshrined.  After Koizumi first visited the shrine in
2001, China used the issue to justify its refusal to engage in bilateral summitry,
except as part of multilateral meetings.   The visit to China of Japan’s new Prime
Minister, Shinzo Abe, on October 8, 2006, signaled a thaw in Sino-Japanese
relations, although Abe’s resignation on September 12, 2007 has left the future of
this thaw in some doubt.  From April 11-13, 2007, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao made
an official visit to Japan, where the two sides pledged to build “a mutually beneficial
relationship based on common strategic interests” and to enhance cooperation on
environmental issues.69  
As with other Asian countries, China’s trading relations with Japan have
expanded; in 2004, China (including Hong Kong) surpassed the United States as
Japan’s largest trading partner,70 but the political relationship remains hampered by
the residual resentments of Japan’s conquest and occupation of China during World
War II.  Furthermore, China’s growing economic competitiveness and expanding
regional presence have helped exacerbate its relations with Tokyo.  China and Japan
have competed ferociously for access to Siberian oil, with each vying to be the major
winner in a pipeline contract with Russia.  As a result of China’s exploration
activities in the Chunxiao Gas Field, in waters where Japan and Taiwan also have
territorial claims, Tokyo has begun its own exploration activities in and around the
Senkakus.  Tensions also have escalated over China’s oil explorations in areas of the
South China Sea over which Japan also claims sovereignty.  Finally, many Chinese
leaders remain suspicious of Japan’s recent attempts to become a more “normal
nation” by becoming more diplomatically assertive and by expanding its military
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capabilities.  Some in Beijing have criticized the Bush Administration for supporting
or even encouraging these trends in Japan.71  
Russia.  Energy resources and security issues also factor heavily into China’s
relations with Russia, where as noted above Beijing and Tokyo are in an ongoing
competition for Siberian oil access.  In March 2006, Russian President Vladimir
Putin announced plans to open a gas pipeline to China within five years.72  President
Hu made a three-day official visit to Russia on March 26, 2007, where he attended
the opening ceremony of the “Year of China in Russia” and discussed increasing the
two countries’ “pragmatic cooperation” and “strategic coordination” in both
international and regional affairs.73    
Russian leaders also meet regularly with PRC leaders through the forum of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Russia is one of the six members.  On
February 2, 2005, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and visiting PRC State
Councillor Tang Jiaxuan announced that their two countries would begin holding
regular security consultations.74  According to Councillor Tang, China considers
Russia its “main partner for strategic cooperation,” and he emphasized that this was
the first time that China had ever established national security consultations with a
foreign government.   The two countries held eight days of joint military exercises
beginning August 18, 2005, involving 7,000 Chinese troops and 1,800 Russian
troops.  Despite lingering historical tensions between the two, the PRC and Russia
are widely thought to be seeking mutual common ground as a counterweight to U.S.
global power.
European Union.   In recent years, China has courted the European Union
(EU) intensively, and Sino-EU contacts have broadened significantly as a result.  On
October 24, 2006, the European Commission released a new paper to the European
Parliament entitled “EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities.”  The
document reinforced the trends remarked upon several years ago by European
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso — that the EU considers China a
“strategic partner” and has made developing Sino-EU ties “one of our top foreign
policy objectives in the years to come.”75   On January 18, 2007, the European
Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, delivered a speech
in Beijing entitled “The EU and China: Moving Forward.”  On May 28, 2007, these
efforts were followed (in Beijing) by the first EU-China Ministerial meeting since the
new framework for partnership was unveiled in October 2006.  
By the same token, the EU has taken a firmer action overall on a number of
economic issues involving China that mirror U.S. economic and trade concerns.  At
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various times in 2007, key EU officials have threatened retaliatory measures against
China if Beijing failed to restrain the low-cost exports that are boosting the
burgeoning EU trade deficit with China;76 suggested that the EU may initiate action
against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) if Beijing did not tighten and
improve its dismal record at protecting intellectual property rights (IPR);77 and
intimated that if China failed to improve the safety of its product and food exports,
the EU would block market access.78  
Middle East and Africa.  For years, China has sold missile technology and
other sensitive materials to countries of security concern to the United States, such
as Iran, Syria, Libya, and Iraq.  More recently, China also is becoming a major energy
player in the Middle East with some of these same countries.  In addition, China’s
trade with the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries has steadily increased
in recent years, reportedly reaching $32 billion in 2005 (although this is still small
by comparison with the United States, whose total trade with Saudi Arabia alone in
2005 was approximately $34 billion).79  
The PRC’s growing relations with Iran are particularly troubling to the Bush
Administration, which is seeking to sanction Iran and to use diplomatic pressure to
halt its suspected nuclear weapons program.  China has opposed efforts to reinforce
U.N. Security Council sanctions on Iran, saying such a move would have a negative
impact on Chinese economic interests.  Chinese negotiators, for instance, were able
to sign significant oil deals with Iran in 2004, including a proposal that allows a PRC
company develop Iran’s Yadavarn oil field in exchange for China’s agreeing to buy
Iranian liquified natural gas.80   According to a statement by Iran’s Interior Minister,
on September 14, 2007, Sino-Iran energy cooperation is on track, and two-way trade
is expected to reach US $20 billion in 2007.  
The PRC also has placed a premium on its relations in Africa, with President
Hu Jintao having embarked on his third trip to Africa in three years on January 30,
2007.81   PRC relations with Sudan have been especially problematic for the United
States and other western countries, which have placed increasing pressure on Beijing
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to influence the Sudanese government to do more to resolve the humanitarian crisis
in Darfur.  Beijing has vowed to use its U.N. Security Council position to block
stronger U.N. sanctions on Sudan, but Chinese leaders say they have raised the issue
of Darfur with the Sudanese government (a statement made by President Hu again
during his January-February 2007 trip).  But Beijing also has appointed a special
envoy to Darfur ( Liu Guijin) and has pledged to send a 315-member detachment of
engineers to Darfur to assist in peace-keeping operations, suggesting a measure of
concern about western objections to Sino-Sudan relations.  
In 2000, China and African countries formed the China-Africa Cooperation
Forum (CACF), proposing that the CACF meet every three years to seek mutual
economic development and cooperation.  Representatives from 45 of Africa’s 55
countries attended the CACF’s first Ministerial Conference in October of that same
year; the third CACF meeting was in Beijing in early November 2006.  China has
also targeted resource-rich African nations such as Sudan and Angola  for energy-
related development.82  Senior Chinese leaders in 2004 visited oil-producing states,
including Algeria and Gabon, and news reports early in 2005 alleged that a  state-
owned PRC energy company, China Shine, planned to drill exploratory wells in a
Namibian concession that was once held by Occidental Petroleum.83  China has also
shown an interest in iron ore deposits in Liberia and Gabon.  In addition to resource-
related imperatives, some observers have suggested that there is a political dynamic
to China’s push into Africa, as 5 of the 24 countries that still maintain official
diplomatic relations with Taiwan are on the African continent.84
Western Hemisphere.85  There is also a political dynamic in China’s
expanding economic and trade relationships with Latin America and the Caribbean,
where another 12 countries still maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.86
In addition, China’s growing presence in the region also may have political and
economic consequences for the United States.  In September 2004, China sent a
“special police” contingent to Haiti, one of Taiwan’s official relationships, marking
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Beijing’s first deployment of forces ever in the Western Hemisphere.  On November
18, 2005, Chile, after months of bilateral negotiations, signed the Sino-Chilean Free
Trade Agreement (FTA).  Beijing officials have said they hope the Sino-Chile FTA
will become a model for similar agreements with other Latin American countries.87
Energy concerns also play a role in China’s Latin-American diplomacy,
particularly in Venezuela, which now accounts for almost 15% of U.S. oil imports,
and in Brazil, with whom China announced a $10 billion energy deal in November
2004.88  As a consequence of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s visit to Beijing
in December 2004 and PRC Vice-President Zeng Qinghong’s visit to Venezuela in
January 2005, the two countries reportedly signed a series of agreements that
committed the China National Petroleum Corporation to spend over $400 million to
develop Venezuelan oil and gas reserves.89  Given the current poor state of U.S.-
Venezuelan relations under the Chavez government, some American observers worry
that Venezuelan energy agreements with China ultimately may serve to divert oil
from the United States.  
Chinese economic and energy concerns extend also to Canada.  On January 20,
2005, at the conclusion of Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin’s visit to China, the
two governments signed a series of agreements to promote international cooperation
on a range of issues and to make energy issues in particular — including gas, nuclear,
clean energy, and oil sources, primarily massive “oil sands” in Alberta — into
“priority areas” of mutual cooperation.  Energy discussions are to be maintained
through the Canada-China Joint Working Group on Energy Cooperation, formed
under a 2001 memorandum of understanding.  A major Canadian oil-pipeline
company, Enbridge, is said to be planning a major ($2.2 billion) pipeline project to
transport oil from Alberta’s oil-sands deposits to the west coast for shipment to wider
markets including China.90  
Environmental Issues
China’s economic development and need for greater energy resources also is
having a rapidly increasing impact on the environment, both within China and for its
regional and global neighbors.  Although China alone has been the source of 40% of
the world’s oil demand growth since 2000,91 its continued heavy dependence on soft
coal in recent years has made it second only to the United States as the largest
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contributor to global carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions, with Reuters reporting on
June 20, 2007, that China had surpassed the United States in CO2 emissions.  
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, carbon emissions related to
China’s energy use more than doubled between 1980 and 2003, an increase that has
had a corresponding impact on air quality, agriculture, human health, and climate
change.  PRC leaders have recognized that this trend is not sustainable and have
undertaken efforts to address environmental quality, including establishment in 1998
of the State Environmental Protection Administration, adoption of a series of
environmental laws and regulations, and mandatory conversion of many government
vehicles to non-polluting liquified petroleum and natural gas.92  Despite this, PRC
efforts to date have been unable to keep up with the extensive and worsening
pollution from China’s growing economic development.
Beijing’s push to meet more of its development needs through the cleaner
technology of hydro-power has exacerbated other long-term environmental problems
in China.  To generate electric power, the government has launched massive dam
construction projects, continuing a phenomenon that occurred throughout centuries
of Chinese history to tame recurring floods.93  Projects such as the Three Gorges
Dam, now being built on the Yangtze River, have been criticized heavily by
environmental scientists who blame these and other such constructions for
significantly contributing to the country’s worsening desertification and flood
damage woes.  Moreover, since some of the region’s most significant rivers originate
in the mountains of Tibet, China’s hydro-power development programs are
increasingly affecting its neighbors. China began multiple dam construction on the
upper Mekong River in Yunnan Province with little thought to the resulting impact
on Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, the dams’ downstream
neighbors.  Other important regional rivers originating in Tibet include the
Brahmaputra (India and Bangladesh); Irrawaddy (Burma); the Indus (Pakistan); and
the Salween (Burma and Thailand).  
The United States and China engage in energy and environment-related dialogue
through the U.S.-China SED (Strategic Economic Dialogue).  As an outgrowth of
that dialogue, on December 15, 2006, both countries announced that China would
become the third country to join the United States in the FutureGen International
Partnership, a collaborative effort to reduce carbon emissions.  The two countries
also signed an Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Protocol, an effort to
promote clean, renewable energy technology.  The third SED that ended on
December 13, 2007, produced an agreement to establish a working group to explore
cooperation in energy and environmental fields.  
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Domestic Political Issues
Despite China’s rapid economic advances and its expanded international
influence, its internal political and institutional development have not kept
comparable pace.  Increasing social and economic inequities have hobbled the growth
of civil society and have led to growing strains in China’s political and societal fabric
 — between the central government in Beijing and the provincial and municipal
governments in the interior; between the socialist left and the increasingly capitalist
right; between those arguing for economic growth at all costs and those advocating
more sustainable and equitable development; and between the few newly wealthy
who have thrived under economic liberalism and the many desperately poor who
have not.  Leaders in Beijing are thought to be deeply concerned about the political
and social implications of these internal strains and deficiencies, and increasing
debate on and maneuvering around these issues is likely to continue affecting the
political environment in the wake of a key five-year Communist Party Congress held
in Beijing in October 2007.
Social Stability.  The far-reaching economic changes the PRC continues to
undergo have led to increasing disgruntlement among a number of social groups.94
Peasants and farmers in rapidly developing parts of China have labored under heavy
tax burdens and fallen farther behind their urban contemporaries in income.  Some
have had their farmland confiscated by local government and Party officials.
Officials then sell the confiscated land for development, often reportedly offering
little or no compensation to the peasants from which the land was seized, resulting
in sometimes sizable protests. One widely publicized case occurred on December 6,
2005, in the southern Chinese city of Dongzhou (Shanwei), when paramilitary forces
opened fire on villagers demonstrating against the confiscation of their land for the
construction of a new power plant, killing an unknown number of villagers.  
In an effort to address rising rural complaints, the government early in 2005
proposed a new measure, the “2005 Number 1 Document,” to reduce taxes on rural
peasants, increase farm subsidies, and address the widening income gap between
urban and rural residents.  Rising labor unrest, particularly in northern and interior
cities, is another particularly troubling issue for Beijing, a regime founded on
communist-inspired notions of a workers’ paradise.  Increasing labor unrest also has
placed greater pressure on the authority and credibility  of the All-China Federation
of Trade Unions (ACFTU), China’s only legal labor organization.95
17th Party Congress, October 15 - 21, 2007.   In mid-October 2007, the
Chinese Communist Party held its 17th Party Congress — an important Party
conclave held every five years to set the policy direction and make leadership
decisions for the coming five years.  In terms of substance, the 17th Party Congress
brought no surprises.  General Secretary Hu Jintao reported that the Party would
continue to emphasize its overall goal of economic investment and export-oriented
reform, although it would place more importance on encouraging domestic
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consumption.  The key catch-phrase in the report was to adhere to the “Scientific
Development Concept” — a concept designed to move away from a “development
at all costs” approach and toward economic and social progress that focuses on
improvements in people’s livelihood, employment, health, national education,
renewable energy resources, and environmental quality.  Hu’s report also addressed
the issue of Taiwan, adhering to the “one-China” principle but calling also for cross-
strait consultations, ending hostilities, and “reaching a peace agreement.” Taiwan’s
President Chen Shui-bian denounced the overture, saying that basing such a treaty
on the “one-China” principle would make it “a treaty of surrender.”96
  
Political Issues and Democratization. For much of the year leading up
to the 17th Party Congress, U.S. China-watchers followed a remarkably public PRC
debate on political reform that hinted at ongoing internal Party dissension between
conservatives and reformers.97  Despite this, the Party endorsed no major political
reforms and further made clear that its monopoly on power would continue.  But in
a clear sign that the Party is feeling increasing pressure from public sentiment —
what Hu in his report acknowledged as the “growing enthusiasm of the people for
participation in political affairs” — Hu’s report called for modest, controversial, and
potentially far-reaching democratization reforms, but only within the Party itself.
These included allowing greater public participation in nominating Party leaders at
grassroots  levels and allowing ordinary Party members to participate in direct
elections for lower level leaders, among others. 
New Leaders.   The Party also chose its new leaders for the coming five years.
As expected, Party Secretary Hu Jintao was reaffirmed to his leadership role, and he
along with five other senior leaders remained on the nine-member Politburo Standing
Committee (PSC), the Party’s most authoritative and important entity.  Of the four
new PSC members, two — Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang — have been tipped as
frontrunners to be Hu Jintao’s successor as Party Secretary at the 18th Party Congress
in 2012.  The two are the only PSC members to have been born in the 1950s, making
them the first of the “fifth generation” of China’s potential leadership to rise to this
level.  If accepted retirement practices hold true (at age 68), only these two will be
young enough to remain in the Politburo of the 18th Party Congress. 
Tibet.  The political and cultural status of Tibet remains a difficult issue in
U.S.-China relations and a matter of debate among U.S. policymakers.   Controversy
continues over Tibet’s current political status as part of China, the role of the Dalai
Lama and his Tibetan government-in-exile, and the impact of Chinese control on
Tibetan culture and religious traditions. The U.S. government recognizes Tibet as
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part of China and has always done so, although some dispute the historical
consistency of this U.S. position.   But the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader,
has long had strong supporters in the U.S. Congress who have continued to pressure
the White House to protect Tibetan culture and give Tibet greater status in U.S. law.
It was largely because of this congressional pressure that in 1997, U.S. officials
created the position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues.  The current Special
Coordinator — Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs — is
the highest-ranking U.S. official to have held this position.98
Status of The Panchen Lama.   Controversy has continued over the fate of
a young boy recognized by the Dalai Lama in 1995 as the 11th reincarnation of the
Panchen Lama — the second highest-ranking lama in Tibetan Buddhism.  (Tibetans
believe that when a high-ranking spiritual leader dies, he is then reincarnated to await
rediscovery by special “search committees.”) Beijing reportedly was furious that the
Dalai Lama made his announcement unilaterally without involving leaders in Beijing,
saying this a direct challenge to central government authority.  PRC officials,
maintaining that only they had the authority to name this spiritual leader, named
another boy, five-year-old Gyaltsen Norbu, who was officially enthroned as the 11th
Panchen Lama on November 29, 1995.  While this second boy made his first official
appearance before an international audience on April 13, 2006, the Chinese
government has never allowed anyone to have access to or information about the first
boy recognized by the Dalai Lama.  Allegedly he remains with his family under
government supervision (some say house arrest), with his whereabouts being kept
secret.  The missing boy turns 18 this year.  
China’s New “Reincarnation Law”.   The case of the 11th Panchen Lama
raised implications for what happens upon the death and subsequent reincarnation of
the current Dalai Lama (the 14th).  Apparently mindful of its previous experience,
Beijing took steps in 2007 designed to assure its future control over the selection
process.  On August 3, 2007, the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA)
issued a set of regulations, effective September 1, 2007,  requiring prior government
approval for all Tibetan Buddhist reincarnations through the submission of a
“reincarnation application.”   In a statement accompanying the regulations, SARA
called the step “... an important move to institutionalize management on
reincarnation of living Buddhas.”99  The Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy, Lodi Gyaltsen
Gyari, described the regulations as a blow against “the heart of Tibetan religious
identity.”  SARA’s regulations also require that reincarnation applications come from
“legally registered venues” for Tibetan Buddhism, a provision seen as an attempt to
illegalize the reincarnation of the current Dalai Lama — now living in exile in Nepal
 — who has declared he will not be reborn in China if circumstances in Tibet remain
unchanged.   The regulations insert the Chinese government directly into what for
centuries has been one of the principal mystical and religious aspects of Tibetan
Buddhism.
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Sino-Tibetan Negotiations.  One of the responsibilities of the U.S. Special
Coordinator for Tibet (now Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global
Affairs Paul Dobriansky) is to encourage negotiations and other contacts between the
PRC government and the Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile.  Under the Tibetan
Policy Act of 2002 (Section 613 of P.L. 107-228), the Coordinator is to issue an
annual report on her office’s activities and on the status of any Sino-Tibetan
negotiations.  The most recent report submitted by Under Secretary Dobriansky,
dated June 2007, found grounds for limited optimism on Sino-Tibetan contacts, but
raised questions about whether the momentum could be sustained.100  
In addition to this report, the Under Secretary’s office is responsible for
submitting the annual State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
mandated by Sections 116(d) and 502(B)(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
The section on China specifically includes separate accounts for Tibet, Hong Kong,
and Macau.  While the latest report (released in March 2007) judges the PRC
government’s human rights record in Tibet to remain very poor, it finds the same
limited grounds for optimism on Sino-Tibetan contacts as does the latest Tibet
negotiations report cited above.101    
Grounds for optimism in Sino-Tibetan talks have been raised slightly by a set
of recurring interactions between the PRC government and delegations from the
Tibetan community led by the Dalai Lama’s special envoy in the United States, Lodi
Gyaltsen Gyari.102 In these negotiations, the Dalai Lama’s special envoy has
acknowledged differences but also had favorable reactions to the talks, saying “Our
Chinese counterparts made clear their interest in continuing the present process and
their firm belief that the obstacles can be overcome through more discussions and
engagements.”103  From June 29-July 5, 2007, Lodi Gyari and another Dalai Lama
envoy, Kelsang Gyaltsen, held the sixth round of these talks in Beijing.  The two
envoys’ description of the discussions — that they were “candid and frank” and
involved the Tibetan side’s “serious concerns [expressed] in the strongest possible
manner” — suggests little progress in the dialogue process.104 
Xinjiang’s Ethnic Muslims.  For years, the PRC government also has
maintained a repressive crackdown against Tibetans and Muslims, particularly
against Uighur “separatists” — those in favor of independence from China — in the
Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in western China.  U.S. officials warned after
September 11, 2001 that the global anti-terror campaign should not be used to
persecute Uighurs or other minorities with political grievances against Beijing.  But
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some believe that the U.S. government made a concession to the PRC on August 26,
2002, when it announced that it was placing one small group in China, the East
Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), on the U.S. list of terrorist groups.  In early
January 2007, PRC officials claimed that the ETIM was the target of a Chinese raid
on a suspected terrorism camp in Xinjiang.  No details were given, although PRC
officials reportedly said that 18 were killed and 17 arrested.105
U.S. policies on Uighurs and on terrorism have faced a unique test since it
became known that approximately 22 Uighur Muslims were being held by U.S.
forces at Guantanamo Bay after having been apprehended during the U.S. strikes
against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some of the Guantanamo prisoners, including
two Uighurs were determined by the U.S. government in 2005 to not be “military
combatants,” and since then have been pursuing legal action against the United States
in an effort to be released.106   A few of the Uighur prisoners have been released to
a refugee center in Albania, the only country that would accept them.107 According
to press reports, other remaining Uighur prisoners were moved in December 2006 to
a new high-security Guantanamo facility, where they reportedly are being kept in
solitary confinement.108
Internet and Media Restrictions.  The explosive growth of the Internet, cell
phones, and text messaging in China has helped make these relatively unregulated
electronic sources the dominant source of information for PRC citizens.  Beijing has
increasingly viewed these new information sources as potential  threats to the central
government’s ability to control information flows, and for several years PRC leaders
have attempted to restrict and control the scope of Web content and access.  
On September 25, 2005, China imposed new regulations designed to further
limit the type of electronic news and opinion pieces available to the Web-savvy in
China.109  Among other things, the regulations prohibits major search engines from
posting their own independent commentary on news stories, stipulating that only
opinion pieces provided by state-controlled media may be posted; requires internet
service providers to record the content, times, and Internet addresses of news
information that is published and to provide this information to authorities upon
inquiry; and in vague terms prohibits certain kinds of content from being posted, such
as content that “undermines state policy” or “disseminates rumors [and] disturbs
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social order.”110  The regulations are backed by penalties, including fines, termination
of Internet access, and possible imprisonment.
Human Rights
The Bush Administration generally has favored selective, intense pressure on
individual human rights cases and on rule of law issues rather than the broader
approach adopted by previous American administrations.  The PRC government
periodically has acceded to this White House pressure and released early from prison
political dissidents, usually citing health reasons and often immediately preceding
visits to China by senior Bush Administration officials.  On March 14, 2005, for
instance, PRC officials released Uighur businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer, arrested in
1999 for “revealing state secrets.”  The same day, the U.S. government announced
that it would not introduce a resolution criticizing China’s human rights record at the
61st Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in Geneva from
March 14 to April 22, 2005.111   
There were no such symbolic PRC gestures before President Bush’s November
2005 visit to China.  Moreover, during his Asia visit, President Bush publicly
adopted a different human rights approach, making universal freedom, religious
freedom, and democratization appear to be the centerpiece of U.S. policy in Asia.
There has been little sign that the U.S. position on human rights has affected PRC
policies, although there is growing evidence of increasing social demands within
China for greater accountability, transparency, and responsiveness in government,
particularly in cases of official corruption and malfeasance.  
Religious Freedom.  The PRC continues to crack down on unauthorized
religious groups and to restrict the freedoms of ethnic communities that seek greater
religious autonomy.  Much of this repression focuses on what PRC officials have
classified as illegal religious “cults” such as the Falun Gong and the Three Grades
of Servants Church.112  Reports about religious freedom in China suggest that state
persecution of some religious and spiritual groups will likely continue as long as the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) perceives these groups to be threatening to its
political control.  However, religions in the PRC have also attracted increasing
numbers of adherents as well.
In the China section of its most recent annual International Religious Freedom
Report, released September 14, 2007, the U.S. Department of State judged China’s
record on religious freedom to remain poor and substantially the same as during
previous years. The State Administration for Religious Affairs, SARA, (formerly
known as the Religious Affairs Bureau, or RAB) continues to require churches to
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register with the government.  Churches that are unregistered, so-called house
churches, continue to be technically illegal and often repressed by the government.
As in the past, however, treatment of unregistered churches varies widely from
locality to locality, with some local officials highly repressive and others surprisingly
tolerant.  
Some suggest that in recent years the Communist Party has sought ways to
recognize religion as an integral part of Chinese society and to support religious
practices that it deems to perform positive social and political functions.  At a
national work conference on religion in 2001, for instance, then-Party Secretary Jiang
Zemin stressed religion’s positive role in society. On the other hand, by 2004 it
appeared that Party officials had grown more concerned about religion’s “de-
stabilizing” effects.  In January 2004, SARA held a national work conference on
religion that instead emphasized what it saw as negative and destabilizing aspects of
religious observance, including  cults and the growing circulation of foreign religious
materials.  As they have in the past, Communist Party officials continue now to stress
that religious belief is incompatible with Party membership.  
Family Planning Policies.  Because of allegations of forced abortions and
sterilizations in PRC family planning programs, direct and indirect U.S. funding for
coercive family planning practices is prohibited in provisions of several U.S. laws.
In addition, legislation in recent years has expanded these restrictions to include U.S.
funding for international and multilateral family planning programs, such as the U.N.
Population Fund (UNFPA), that have programs in China.  (Section 660(c) of the
House-passed version of H.R. 2764, the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Bill for FY2008 Department, prohibits funds for
a UNFPA country program in China and requires a report on the UNFPA China
program from the Secretary of State. The House passed the measure on June 21,
2007.)
While the PRC has maintained its restrictive and at times coercive “one-child”
program for several decades, there are growing indications that the government may
be re-thinking this policy.  Early in 2004, China’s new leadership appointed a task
force to study the country’s demographic trends and their implications for economic
development.  In October 2004, reports surfaced that Beijing was considering at least
one proposal to eventually scrap the one-child policy because of currently low PRC
birth rates and the economic implications this has for supporting China’s huge aging
population.  On January 6, 2005, the director of China’s National Population and
Family Planning Commission stated that the government intended to modify criminal
law to make it illegal to selectively identify and abort female fetuses.113  
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There also is growing evidence that citizens of the PRC are becoming more
assertive about their reproductive rights.114  In mid-May 2007, news accounts
reported violent public protests in Guangxi Province (Bobai County) over the
“savage implementation” of family planning policies by local authorities, including
the retroactive imposition of extraordinarily heavy fines and the confiscation or
destruction of household goods and food.115
Hong Kong Governance 
China’s Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), a British colony
until being returned to Chinese rule in 1997, remains a political work-in-progress
under several Sino-British agreements reached concerning the territory’s governance.
Promised “a high degree of autonomy” by Beijing — and ultimately universal
suffrage and full democracy — Hong Kong functions as an effectively separate
system with a certain level of democratization and significantly greater individual
and political freedoms than mainland China.  But many of Hong Kong’s
approximately 6 million  residents fault what they see as Beijing’s covert and at times
direct intervention in setting a glacial pace for Hong Kong’s democratic reforms.  
On March 25, 2007, for instance, Hong Kong’s Executive, Donald Tsang, won
a second five-year term to that post in an election in which the only eligible voters
were the 795 members of the Hong Kong Election Committee.  Pro-democracy
activists had argued that Hong Kong was politically mature enough to conduct the
election by universal suffrage, but this was refuted by Beijing.  Still the 2007 election
was the first in which a challenger, Alan Leong, took on the incumbent who was
universally seen as Beijing’s choice for the post.  In addition, Chief Executive Tsang
and Mr. Leong held two public TV debates — again an unprecedented development
for Hong Kong.  
Chief Executive Tsang, generally seen as able and well-respected, replaced
Hong Kong’s unpopular former Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, who submitted his
resignation on March 10, 2005, two years before his term was to expire.  Controversy
under Mr. Tung’s tenure grew steadily after late summer 2003, when massive
peaceful demonstrations, involving tens of thousands of Hong Kongers began to be
held in opposition to “anti-sedition” laws proposed by Mr. Tung and in favor of more
rapid progress toward democratization. Beijing dealt these democratic aspirations a
stinging setback in April 2004 by ruling that universal suffrage not only was not to
be allowed as early as 2007 (when Hong Kong’s constitution, the Basic Law, implies
it is possible), but that Beijing, and not Hong Kong, would determine the proper pace
for democratic reforms. 
While a pragmatist, Chief Executive Tsang also has been criticized by Hong
Kong’s democracy activists.  As the territory’s Chief Secretary, Mr. Tsang had
chaired a Tung-appointed task force charged with consulting Beijing to devise a plan
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for democratic reforms in Hong Kong in 2007 and 2008.  The task force’s final
recommendations, submitted in October 2005, provided for only marginal changes
to electoral procedures in 2007 and 2008, stopping far short of expanding the
franchise in Hong Kong in this decade or for the foreseeable future.  The public
response to the recommendations was one of disappointment.  On December 4, 2005,
opponents of the recommendations held another large public protest in Hong Kong
in favor of greater political change.  Executive Tsang defended the recommendations
as being the most Hong Kong can achieve at the moment given Beijing’s objections
to more rapid democratization.  Democracy activists in the Legislative Council
defeated the minimal reform package on December 21, 2005, leaving the status quo
in place and the prescription for future changes uncertain.
U.S. policy toward Hong Kong is set out in the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of
1992 (P.L. 102-383).  In addition to requiring annual U.S. government reports on
Hong Kong’s conditions through 2006, this act allows the United States to treat Hong
Kong more leniently than it treats the PRC on the condition that Hong Kong remains
autonomous.  Under the act, the President has the power to halt existing agreements
with Hong Kong or take other steps if he determines that Beijing is interfering unduly
in Hong Kong’s affairs.116
U.S. Policy Implications 
Some U.S. observers have become increasingly concerned about China’s
growing economic and political reach in the world, often referred to as “China’s
rise,” and what it means for global U.S. economic and political interests, U.S.-China
relations, and concerns for Taiwan’s security.  Some in this debate believe China’s
rise is a malign threat that needs to be thwarted; others believe that it is an inevitable
phenomenon that needs to be managed.   As was the 109th Congress before it, the
110th Congress is facing recurring issues involving this emerging debate and how
U.S. interests may best be served.  
According to one school of thought, China’s economic and political rise in the
world is inevitable and needs to be accommodated and managed.  In this view, as
China becomes more economically interdependent with the international community,
it will have a greater stake in pursuing stable international economic relationships.
Growing wealth in the PRC is likely to encourage Chinese society to move in
directions that will develop a materially better-off, more educated, and cosmopolitan
populace.  Over time, this population could be expected to press its government for
greater political pluralism and democracy — two key U.S. objectives.   
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Therefore, from this perspective, U.S. policy should seek to work more closely
with the PRC, not only to encourage these positive long-term trends, but to seek ways
to mutually benefit by cooperating on important global issues such as alternative
energy sources, climate change, and scientific and medical advancements.
Ultimately, some proponents of accommodation say, the United States simply will
have to make room for the economic and political appetites of the superpower that
China is likely to become.  Viewing the PRC as a “threat” or attempting to contain
it, these proponents say, could produce disastrous policy consequences for U.S.
interests.  In addition to possible military conflict with the PRC, these consequences
could include a breakdown in PRC governance, a fragmentation of the country itself,
the creation of greater Chinese nationalism with a strong anti-American bias, and/or
an increasingly isolated United States that the international community may see as
out of step with global trends.
Other proponents of the “inevitability” of China’s rise stress especially the
extreme competitive challenges of China’s growing power.  They say these
challenges, even if benign, pose potentially huge consequences for U.S. global
interests.  Beijing officials, say this group, view the world as a state-centered,
competitive environment where power is respected, and PRC leaders are determined
to use all means at their disposal to increase their nation’s wealth, power, and
influence.  A militarily muscular China with substantial international economic ties
will be able to wield considerable political power that could prompt U.S. friends and
allies to make different choices, eroding U.S. influence around the world.  The
United States, they argue, should develop a comprehensive strategic plan in order to
counter China’s growing power by strengthen its existing regional alliances and make
new ones, expand overseas investments, sharpen American global competitiveness,
and maintain a robust military presence in Asia and elsewhere as a counterweight to
growing PRC power and influence.
Others in the American policy debate see less benevolent intentions in China’s
growing power.  PRC leaders, they argue, may be portraying their growth as a
“peaceful rise” with no harmful consequences, but actually they are biding their time,
simply conforming to many international norms as a strategy while China is still
weak.  In reality, these proponents say, Beijing seeks at least to erode and at best to
supplant U.S. international power and influence. In conducting their international
relations, they maintain, Chinese leaders seek to cause rifts in U.S. alliances, create
economic interdependence with U.S. friends, and arm U.S. enemies.  Despite the
statements of support for the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign, according to this view,
the PRC’s repeated violations of its non-proliferation commitments have actually
contributed to strengthening nations that harbor global terrorists.  Furthermore, they
maintain that the PRC under its current repressive form of government is inherently
a threat to U.S. interests, and that the Chinese political system needs to change
dramatically before the United States has any real hope of reaching a constructive
relationship with Beijing.  From this perspective, U.S. policy should focus on
mechanisms to change the PRC from within while remaining vigilant and attempting
to contain PRC foreign policy actions and economic relationships around the world
where these threaten U.S. interests.
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Selected Legislation in the 110th Congress117 
Public Laws
To date, the 110th Congress has enacted into public law the following legislative
measures involving China.
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 — P.L. 110-140.
Introduced as H.R. 6 on January 12, 2007, P.L. 110-140 became the vehicle for
omnibus energy legislation, including provisions concerning China contained in H.R.
3221, introduced by Representative Pelosi.  The final Act includes language that
authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to take efforts to promote U.S. clean energy
technology exports to India, China, and other countries that may benefit.  (The
legislative journey to the public law has a convoluted history, containing selected
provisions from 14 bills, including H.R. 3221, and three resolutions.  The President
signed the omnibus measure into law on December 19, 2007.)
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2008 — P.L. 110-161.  Introduced as H.R. 2764 by
Representative Lowey.  The final public law (P.L. 110-161) included provisions
requiring U.S. representatives at international financial institutions to support
projects in Tibet if they do not provide incentives for non-Tibetan immigration into
Tibet; and provided $5 million in ESF funds to NGOs supporting cultural traditions,
sustainable development, and environmental protection in Tibet.  Section 733 of the
enacted bill prohibited a rule allowing poultry products to be imported from China.
The final bill also required 15-day prior notification to both Appropriations
Committees before processing licenses for the export to China of satellites of U.S.
origin; and provided $15 million in democracy assistance funds for China, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan, providing that monies for Taiwan be matched by non-U.S.
government sources; and $150,000 for the U.S. Senate-China Interparliamentary
Group, to remain available until September 2009.  The final bill also prohibited funds
for a United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) program in China (Section 660(c)).
After a complicated series of procedural floor motions in December 2007, the bill
was sent to the President, who signed it on December 26, 2007.  
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 — P.L. 110-181.
Introduced as H.R. 4986, Section 1263 of P.L. 110-181 adds a reporting requirement
to the Annual Report on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
(authorized in P.L. 106-65).  The new reporting requirement is to include information
on China’s asymmetric and cyber-warfare capabilities.  The bill was signed on
January 28, 2008.  
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Other Pending Legislation
H.Con.Res. 73 (Tancredo)
Expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should resume
diplomatic relations with Taiwan.  Introduced on February 16, 2007. Referred to the
House Foreign Affairs Committee.  
H.Con.Res. 136 (Chabot)
Expressing the sense of Congress that the United States lift restrictions on high-
level visits by officials from Taiwan and allow direct high-level dialogue between
officials from both governments.  Introduced on May 1, 2007.  Referred to the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, which held mark-up on June 26, 2007.  The House
passed the measure by voice vote on July 30, 2007, and the measure was referred to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 3, 2007.
H.Con.Res. 137 (Berkley)
Expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should initiate
immediate negotiations to enter into a free trade agreement with Taiwan.  Introduced
on May 1, 2007.  Referred to the House Ways and Means Committee’s Trade
Subcommittee on May 15, 2007.
H.Res. 422 (Lee)/S.Res. 203 (Menendez)
Calling on the PRC to use its leverage with Sudan to stop the violence in Darfur
and to comply with U.N. directives.  The measure states that the spirit of the
Olympics is incompatible with acts supporting genocide.  The House bill was
introduced on May 21, 2007, and referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
which held markup on May 23, 2007. On June 5, 2007, the House passed the
measure on the suspension calendar by 410-0.  The Senate bill was introduced on
May 16 and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which ordered the
measure reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute on June 27, 2007.
The Senate agreed to its measure on July 30, 2007.
H.Res. 552 (Marshall)
Calling on the PRC to remove barriers on U.S. financial services firms doing
business in China.  Introduced July 17, 2007, and referred to the House Financial
Services Committee.  The House passed the measure on the suspension calendar on
September 5, 2007, by a vote of 401-4.  
H.Res. 628 (Waters)
Expressing the sense of the House that the President boycott the summer 2008
Olympics in Beijing because of PRC activities in Sudan.  Introduced August 4, 2007,
and referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.  (Similar legislation is H.Res.
610 and H.Res. 608, both introduced by Representative Rohrabacher on August 3 and
August 2, 2007.)  
H.Res. 676 (Ros-Lehtinen)
The measure restates and reinforces Section 3(a) of the Taiwan Relations Act
relating to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, emphasizing that decisions shall be made
“based solely” on Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs.  The bill specifically targeted
the Bush Administration’s “non-responsiveness” to Taiwan’s request to buy F-16C/D
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fighters.  Introduced on September 25, 2007, and referred to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee.  The Committee held mark-up on September 26, 2007, and the
full House passed the bill on the suspension calendar by voice vote on October 2,
2007.
H.R. 571 (Tancredo)
A bill to require that additional tariffs be imposed on products of non-market
economies, which the bill specifically defines as including the People’s Republic of
China.  Introduced January 18, 2007.   Referred to the House Ways and Means
Committee, Subcommittee on Trade.
H.R. 678 (Holt)
The National Security Language Act.  The bill seeks to expand and improve
U.S. foreign language study in “less commonly taught” languages, including Chinese.
Introduced January 24, 2007. Referred to House Committees on Education and
Labor; Select Intelligence; Armed Services.  
H.R. 782 (Ryan)
The Fair Currency Act of 2007.  (Related Senate bill S. 796.)   The bill amends
Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 to provide that artificial exchange rates by any
country are countervailable export subsidies.  The bill requires the U.S. Treasury
Secretary annually to analyze foreign countries’ exchange rate policies and embark
on negotiations with those countries whose currencies are judged to be in
“fundamental misalignment.”  Introduced January 31, 2007.  Referred to House Ways
and Means Committee and in addition to the House Committees on Financial
Services; Foreign Affairs; and Armed Services.  
H.R. 1229 (Davis, A., English)
The Non-Market Economy Trade Remedy Act of 2007.  The bill amends long-
standing U.S. law by extending the applicability of countervailing duty measures also
to nonmarket economy countries in addition to market economy countries.  The bill
also notes that “special difficulties” may exist in calculating benefit amounts in China
and authorizes U.S. authorities to use “terms and conditions prevailing outside of
China” in such instances.  Introduced on February 28, 2007.  Referred to the House
Ways and Means Committee (February 28) and to the Trade Subcommittee (March
7), which held hearings on March 15, 2007.  
H.R. 1390 (Tancredo, Rohrabacher)
A bill to require Senate confirmation of individuals appointed to serve as the
Director of the American Institute in Taiwan.  Introduced March 7, 2007.  Referred
to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
H.R. 1469 (Lantos) 
The Senator Paul Simon Study Abroad Foundation Act of 2007.  The bill seeks
to enhance the competitiveness and security of the United States by promoting
foreign language skills and opportunities for expanded study abroad among U.S.
students, particularly specifying “non-traditional” destinations such as the People’s
Republic of China.  The bill establishes, within the U.S. government, a corporation
and program to provide grants to American students under the Mutual Education and
Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2451 et seq). The bill was introduced on
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June 12, 2007, and was reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May
9, 2007 (H.Rept. 110-138).  The House passed the bill by voice vote on the
suspension calendar on June 5, 2007.  On June 7, the measure was referred to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
H.R. 1585 (Skelton)
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008.  Section 1244 of the bill
expresses the sense of Congress that U.S. war-fighting capabilities are potentially
under threat by PRC intentions and urges the Secretary of Defense to expand efforts
to develop accurate assessments of PRC military capabilities and intentions.
Introduced March 20, 2007, and reported to the House Armed Services Committee.
Markup on May 9, 2007, and ordered reported by 58-0 (H.Rept. 110-146).  Passed
by the House May 17, 2007 (397-27), and received in the Senate on June 4, 2007,
which considered the bill for a number of days between June 4 and July 31, 2007,
when the bill was returned to the calendar.   On September 17, 2007, the bill was put
before the Senate by unanimous consent and considered on September 18, 19, and
20.  The Senate passed the bill, amended, on October 1, 2007, (92-3) and requested
a conference with the House.  On December 6, 2007, a Conference Report was filed
(H.Rept. 110-477), and the House agreed to the Conference Report on December 12,
2007, by a vote of 370-49.  Section 1263 of the Conference Report includes a Senate
provision to amend P.L. 106-65 to require inclusion of China’s asymmetric
capabilities in the Pentagon’s annual report on China’s military power.  The House
agreed to the Conference Report on December 12, 2007 (370 - 49); the Senate agreed
to the Conference Report on December 14, 2007 (90 - 3).  The President vetoed the
bill on December 28, 2007.
H.R. 2764 (Lowey) [P.L. 110-161]
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2008.  Section 660(c) of the House-passed version prohibits funds for a UNFPA
country program in China and requires a report on the UNFPA China program from
the Secretary of State.  Section 676 of the House-passed bill relates to Tibet,
including provisions requiring U.S. representatives at international financial
institutions to support projects in Tibet if they do not provide incentives for non-
Tibetan immigration into Tibet; and provides $5 million in ESF funds to NGOs
supporting cultural traditions, sustainable development, and environmental protection
in Tibet.  The Senate version provides $150,000 for the U.S. Senate-China
Interparliamentary Group, to remain available until September 2009; provides $15
million for democracy and rule-of-law programs in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan;
and prohibits funds for a UNFPA program in China (Section 630(b)).  The Senate
version contains Tibet provisions similar to those in the House bill, and in addition
specifies that $250,000 be made available to the National Endowment for Democracy
for programs in Tibet.  The House Appropriations Committee reported an original
measure (H.Rept. 110-197) on June 18, 2007, and the full House passed the bill on
June 22, 2007 (241-178).  The Senate considered the bill on September 6, 2007,
passed a committee substitute (81-12), and requested a conference with the House.
After a complicated series of procedural floor motions in December 2007, the bill
was sent to the President, who signed it on December 26, 2007.  
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H.R. 2942 (Ryan)
The Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act.  To provide for the identification and
correction of “fundamentally misaligned” currencies by applying countervailing
duties to nonmarket economy countries with currencies so identified.    Introduced
on June 28, 2007, and referred to the Committees on Ways & Means, Financial
Services, and Foreign Affairs.  
H.R. 3161 (DeLauro)
The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008.  Section 731 prohibits funds from being
used to import poultry products from China.  The House Appropriations Committee
reported an original measure on July 24, 2007, (H.Rept. 110-258) and passed the bill,
on August 2, 2007 (237-18).  The Senate received the bill on August 3, 2007. 
H.R. 3221 (Pelosi) [P.L. 110-140]
Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 2007.  The bill
authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to take efforts to promote U.S. clean energy
technology exports to India, China, and other countries that may benefit.  Introduced
July 30, 2007, and referred to multiple committees.  On August 3, the Rules
Committee made the bill in order for consideration in the House, where it passed on
August 4, 2007, by a vote of 241-172.  The bill was placed on the Senate calendar on
September 5, 2007.  On October 19, 2007, the full Senate attempted to take up H.R.
3221 by unanimous consent, substitute the Senate amendment to the text of H.R. 6,
pass the amended bill, insist on its amendment, and request a conference.  On
December 5, 2007, the House Rules Committee reported a rule allowing for the
consideration of H.R. 6 in the House.  On December 6, 2007, the House agreed with
amendments to the Senate amendments on H.R. 6 (235 - 181).  On December 13,
2007, the Senate concurred in the House amendment to the Senate amendment, with
an amendment (S.Amdt. 3850), by a vote of 86-8.  The House agreed on December
18, 2007 (314 - 100).  The President signed the bill on December 19, 2007, and it
became P.L. 110-140.
H.R. 3272 (Kirk) 
The U.S.-China Diplomatic Expansion Act.  The bill provides for increased
funding and support for diplomatic engagement with China.  Introduced on August
1, 2007, and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.R. 3273 (Larsen)
The U.S.-China Market Engagement and Export Promotion Act.  The bill
provides for grants to states to operate state offices in China in order to assist U.S.
exporters to promote exports to China.  Introduced on August 1, 2007, and referred
to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.  
H.R. 3274 (Israel) 
The U.S.-China Energy Cooperation Act.  The bill provides for grants to
encourage U.S.-China cooperation on joint research, development, or
commercialization of carbon capture and sequestration technology, improved energy
efficiency, or renewable energy sources.  Introduced on August 1, 2007, and referred
to the House Science and Technology Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and
Environment.  
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H.R. 3275 (Davis)
The U.S.-China Language Engagement Act.  The bill supports programs
offering instruction in Chinese language and culture.  Introduced on August 1, 2007,
and referred to the House Committee on Education and Labor, Subcommittee on
Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary Education.  
S.Res. 203 (Menendez)
A resolution calling on China to use its influence to stop genocide and violence
in Sudan.  Introduced on May 16, 2007, and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.  The Senate passed the measure, amended, on July 30, 2007, by
unanimous consent.
S. 796 (Bunning)
The Fair Currency Act of 2007.  (Related House bill H.R. 782.) The bill amends
Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 to provide that exchange-rate misalignment by any
foreign nation is a countervailable export subsidy and to amend the Exchange Rates
and International Economic Policy Coordination Act of 1988 to clarify the definition
of “manipulation” with respect to currency.  Introduced March 7, 2007.  Referred to
the Senate Finance Committee. 
S. 1607 (Baucus, Schumer, Graham, Grassley)
The Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2007.  The bill provides
for identification and corrective action against “misaligned currencies” that adversely
affect U.S. interests.  The bill requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a
report to Congress twice annually analyzing economic and monetary policies of
major U.S. trading partners and list currencies judged to be “fundamentally
misaligned” (meaning with a prolonged undervaluation with respect to the U.S.
dollar) and a list of currencies designated for “priority action.”  The bill provides for
remedies should a country continue its currency misalignment, including price
adjustments under the anti-dumping law; request for IMF action; suspension of new
OPIC financing; U.S. opposition to multilateral bank financing; and action in the
WTO.  The bill permits the President to waive its provisions based on national
security or “vital economic” interests.  Introduced on June 13, 2007, by Senators
Charles Schumer, Lindsey Graham, Max Baucus, and Charles Grassley, the bill was
referred to the Senate Finance Committee.  The Committee reported the bill on July
31, 2007, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and the bill was placed on
the Senate calendar.  On December 14, 2007, the Senate Finance Committee filed a
written report S.Rept. 110-248.
S. 1677 (Dodd)
The Currency Reform and Financial Markets Access Act of 2007.  Introduced
on June 21, 2007, the bill would require the U.S. Treasury Secretary to analyze
exchange rate policies of foreign countries on an annual basis.  On August 1, 2007,
the Committee ordered the measure reported with an amendment in the nature of a
substitute.
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Chronology
03/17/08 — China’s parliament appointed four new Vice Premiers: Li Keqiang,
Hui Liangyu, Zhang Dejiang, and Wang Qishan.
03/11/08 — Monks in Lhasa launched a protest against Chinese rule on the 49th
anniversary of a violent 1959 anti-Chinese uprising.  On the same
day, the U.S. State Department released its 2007 Country Report on
Human Rights Practices; while saying that China’s human rights
record remained poor, the report dropped China from its list of 10
worst offenders on human rights.
03/05/08 — The annual session of the PRC’s National People’s Congress began.
(It is the 6th plenary meeting of the 1st session of the 11th NPC.)  
01/17/08 — The fifth U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue began in Beijing.  The
Dialogue is jointly chaired by Negroponte and PRC Vice Foreign
Minister Dai Bingguo.  Negroponte reportedly reiterated the U.S.
position on Taiwan’s U.N. referendum.  For the first time, a PRC
military official, General Ding Jingong, attended the dialogue. 
01/16/08 — China announced that new temporary regulations to control food
prices, saying that large producers of some food products (including
dairy, pork, mutton, and eggs) must obtain government approval
before raising prices.  
01/14/08 — In a joint statement with the PRC government, Malawi announced it
was severing official relations with Taiwan and recognizing the PRC,
leaving Taiwan with just 23 remaining official relationships.
01/13/08 — India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh began a three-day visit to
Beijing — the first by an Indian P.M. in almost five years.  The same
day, U.S. Admiral Timothy Keating, the top U.S. military commander
in the Pacific, arrived in China for four days.  Keating reportedly
stressed to his hosts the need to be more open about its rapid military
build-up.  
01/12/08 — Taiwan’s legislative elections were held under its newly reorganized
system: 428 candidates fighting for membership in the new 113-seat
body.  The KMT crushed the DPP, winning 81 seats to the DPP’s 27.
Five more seats were won by parties likely to support KMT positions.
Two referenda questions also were not passed. 
12/12/07 — The third meeting of the bi-annual U.S.-China Strategic Economic
Dialogue (SED) began in Xianghe, China.  The two sides signed a 10-
year agreement to work together on clean technology and sustainable
natural resources.  
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12/11/07 — The United States and China signed an agreement to strengthen
regulation of drugs and medical devises that China exports to the
United States.  
11/21/07 — A planned port visit by the USS Kitty Hawk carrier battle group to
Hong Kong for Thanksgiving was abruptly cancelled without
explanation by the PRC government.  An announcement to reverse
the decision was made at a Foreign Ministry press conference on
November 22, 2007, but it was too late for the Kitty Hawk, which had
by then bypassed Hong Kong and gone on to Japan.  
11/20/07 — Two U.S. minesweepers, the Patriot and the Guardian, were denied
access to the port of Hong Kong when they sought refuge there from
an approaching storm. 
11/20/07 — The Federal Register published a DOD notice of a proposed Letter
of Offer for an arms sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural
Representative Office (Taiwan) for upgrade and refurbishment of
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Guided Missiles.
[Transmittal No. 08-10, pursuant to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms
Export Control Act.]   
11/06/07 — Jerry Yang and Michael Callahan, executives with Yahoo, were
grilled by the House Foreign Affairs Committee about Yahoo’s
turning revealing to China the name of a Chinese journalist holding
a Yahoo e-mail account. 
10/24/07 — China launched its first unmanned lunar probe, the Chang’e 1 orbiter,
rocket in the first of a three-stage lunar program, to include landing
a rover on the moon by 2012 and a manned lunar mission by 2020. 
10/21/07 — The 17th Party Congress closed (having begun on October 15),
resulting in a new Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee,
Secretariat, and Central Military Commission.
10/17/07 — The Dalai Lama received the Congressional Gold Medal at a
ceremony in the Capitol Rotunda attended by President Bush and
senior congressional leaders.  Beijing strongly protested the decision.
09/19/07 — For the 15th consecutive year, a U.N. General Assembly Committee
(the General Committee) rejected the recommendation that Taiwan’s
formal U.N. membership be considered at this year’s General
Assembly meeting.  
09/17/07 — China announced it would send a 315-member engineering unit to
Darfur in October 2007 as part of a combined UN-African Union
force of 26,000.  
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09/17/07 — The Financial Times reported that China had rejected shipments of
U.S. and Canadian port because they contained the additive
ractopamine, a banned substance  in China.
09/16/07 — China’s Taiwan Affairs Office said that Beijing had “made necessary
preparations” to “deal with serious conditions” as a result of Taiwan’s
UN membership bid. 
09/15/07 — New York Times researcher Zhao Yan, arrested for “leaking state
secrets,” was released from prison after serving a three-year sentence
for accepting money from a source, a charge he denied. 
09/12/07 — The Pentagon announced $2.2 billion in possible military sales to
Taiwan, including 12 surplus Orion P3-C maritime patrol craft and
144 SM-2 Block 3A Standard anti-aircraft missiles, built by
Raytheon. 
09/10/07 — Taiwan Defense Minister Ko Cheng-heng said that Taiwan had an
“urgent and legitimate need” to buy F-16s.  Minister Ko made the
statement while attending the Sixth U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry
Conference in the United States.  
08/17/07 — The PRC published a white paper entitled “The Quality and Safety of
Food in China.”  
08/15/07 — PRC Embassy officials in Washington held a rare news conference to
defend the quality of Chinese imports.  
08/14/07 — Mattel announced that it was recalling 436,000 Chinese-made toy
cars and 18.2 million other toys because of magnets that could
become dislodged and harm children if swallowed. 
07/25/07 — The IMF released its 2007 projections, concluding that China had
now surpassed the United States as the main engine of the world’s
economic growth.  
07/10/07 — China announced it had executed Zheng Xiaoyu, the former head of
the State Food and Drug Administration, for accepting bribes to
approve tainted or fraudulent drugs.
06/28/07 — The U.S. FDA issued an import alert requiring 5 types of farm-raised
seafood from China to be tested for banned antibiotics before
allowing entry.
06/20/07 — Reuters reported that China had overtaken the U.S. as the world’s top
emitter of carbon gases.  
06/20/07 — The U.S.-China Senior Dialogue began, hosted by Deputy Secretary
John Negroponte at the State Department in Washington, with Dai
Bingguo in the PRC interlocutor role.  
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06/19/07 — In a State Department press briefing, Sean McCormack reacted to a
question about Taiwan, saying, “We do not support Taiwan’s
membership in international organizations that require statehood [for
membership].... The United States opposes any initiative that appears
designed to change Taiwan’s status unilaterally.  This would include
a referendum on whether or apply to the United Nations under
Taiwan.” 
06/13/07 — The U.S. Treasury Department released a mandated, semi-annual
report to Congress on international exchange rates, concluding that
China “did not meet the technical requirements for designation” [as
a currency manipulator] under U.S. law. 
06/06/07 — Costa Rica announced it was breaking relations with Taiwan and
establishing relations with the PRC.
05/31/07 — In the second such case this year (the first was on March 30), the
Commerce Department announced it was imposing additional
preliminary duties — as much as 99.7% — on imports of glossy
paper made in China. 
05/23/07 — Two days of talks began in Washington in the second meeting of the
U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) on the U.S.-China
trade imbalance and China’s currency valuation.
05/09/07 — 120 members of the House sent a letter to PRC President Hu Jintao
requesting that China use its influence with Sudan to try to halt the
genocide in Darfur, linking failure to act with a tarnishing of the PRC
image at the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. 
05/05/07 — China announced it was severing diplomatic relations with St. Lucia
after the Caribbean country normalized relations with Taiwan.  
04/02/07 — The U.S. FDA blocked wheat gluten imports from Xuzhou Anying
Biologic Technology Development in Wangdien, China, as a result
of recent pet deaths in the U.S. from tainted pet food.
03/28/07 — China and Russia signed $4.3 billion in trade deals during President
Hu Jintao’s visit.  
03/27/07 — A Chinese-born U.S. engineer, Chi Mak, went on trial in Los Angeles
for allegedly providing sensitive Navy weapons technology to China.
03/08/07 — In his nomination hearing (for top U.S. military commander in the
Pacific) before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral
Timothy Keating said he would seek robust engagement with China’s
navy.  
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03/07/07 — U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said “I do not see China, at this
point, as a strategic adversary of the United States.  It’s a partner in
some respects, it’s a competitor in other respects...” 
02/02/07 — According to a State Department spokesman, the United States will
need to “evaluate” future civil space cooperation with China in light
of China’s January 11, 2007 ASAT test.  
01/24/07 — The head of the PRC’s National Population and Family Planning
Commission reported there were 118 boys born for every 100 girls in
China in 2005, which he called “a worsening gender imbalance.” 
01/23/07 — A PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman confirmed that China had fired
a missile to destroy one of its orbiting satellites.
01/18/07 — Bush Administration officials announced that China had tested its
first anti-satellite weapon on January 11, reportedly noting that the
U.S. had expressed concern to Beijing about the test. 
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Appendix A. 
Selected Visits by U.S. and PRC Officials
(For U.S.-PRC visits during the 109th Congress, see CRS Report RL32804.)
February 23, 2008 — Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice traveled to China,
Korea, and Japan, holding a joint press conference with Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
on February 26, 2008.
January 16, 2008 — U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte arrived
in Beijing to attend the fifth U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, scheduled for the 17th
and 18th.  
January 12, 2008 — Admiral Timothy J. Keating, commander of the U.S.
Pacific Command,  left for a week-long trip to China.  It was the first high-level
military exchange since the PRC denied the Kitty Hawk’s request for a port visit to
Hong Kong over the Thanksgiving holiday.  
December 11, 2007 — U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson arrived in
Beijing for the third official Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED).  The meeting
resulted in agreements on food and product safety, energy, and the environment. 
November 4, 2007 — U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates arrived in
Beijing for a three-day visit, his first official visit to China as Secretary of Defense.
Both sides reached consensus on a number of issues, including setting up an official
military hotline. 
August 17, 2007 — U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Navy Admiral Michael
G. Mullen arrived in Beijing for a visit, including stops in Beijing, naval facilities
along China’s east and northeast coasts, and the naval academy in Dalian.  
July 23, 2007 — Air Force General Paul V. Hester, the U.S. Pacific Air Forces
commander, began a five-day visit to China, the first by a senior U.S. military officer
to meet primarily with PLAAF officials.  His visit included the first visit by an
American commander to Jining Air Base, as well as to Jianqiao Air Base.  
May 10, 2007 — New U.S. Pacific forces commander Admiral Timothy J.
Keating began his first five-day visit to China as Pacific commander.  He took
command in his new post on March 26, 2007.  He pledged to continue to improve
U.S.-China military contacts and exchanges and to intensify joint exercises.  
March 22, 2007 — U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Marine General Peter
Pace arrived in Beijing for a visit, including a trip to Anshan Air Base in the
Shenyang Military Region.  There, Pace examined a PRC-built Su-27 fighter-
bomber.
March 7, 2007 — U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson arrived in Beijing for
his third official visit in his seven-month tenure as Secretary.  His visit purportedly
was to discuss with his counterpart, Wu Yi, the second meeting (upcoming in May)
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of the U.S.-China strategic economic dialogue in the United States.  The Secretary
reportedly urged China to open its markets more quickly.
March 3, 2007 — On his first official visit to Asia as Deputy Secretary of State,
John Negroponte arrived in Beijing for three days of talks.  He met with Foreign
Minister Li Zhaoxing, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, and vice foreign ministers Dai
Bingguo and Yang Jiechi.  At the end of his trip, he addressed the 17.8% increase in
China’s military budget, saying the United States wanted China to clarify its “plans
and intentions” for its military program.
March 2, 2007 — Alan Holmer, new U.S. Special Envoy for Strategic
Economic Dialogue with China, met in Beijing with Vice Premier Wu Yi.  
January 23, 2007 — U.S. Assistant Secretary for Commerce Chris Padilla left
for Beijing to discuss export controls.
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Appendix B. 
Selected U.S. Government Reporting Requirements
Report on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies 
(semiannual report)
Most recent date available: December 19, 2007
Agency: U.S. Department of the Treasury
Legislative authority: P.L. 100-418, the Omnibus Trade & Competitive Act of
1988
Full text:  [http://www.treasury.gov/offices/international-affairs/
economic-exchange-rates/pdf/Dec2007-Report.pdf]
International Religious Freedom Report, China (annual report)
Most recent date available: September 14, 2007
Agency:  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor
Legislative authority:  P.L. 105-292, the International Religious Freedom Act
(IRFA) of 1998, Section 102(b) 
Full text:  [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/] 
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (annual report)
Most recent date available: May 2007
Agency:  U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
Legislative authority:  P.L. 105-292, the International Religious Freedom Act
(IRFA) of 1998, Section 203
Full text: [http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/currentreport/
2007annualRpt.pdf#page=1]
Reports on Human Rights Practices, China (annual report)
Most recent date available: March 11, 2008 
Agency:  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor
Legislative authority:  The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended,
Sections 116(d) and 502(b); and the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, Section
504
Full text:  [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/index.htm]
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (annual report)
Most recent date available: March 2008 
Agency:  U.S. Department of Defense
Legislative authority:  P.L. 106-65, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2000, Section 1202
Full text: [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf]
 
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 
(annual report)
Most recent date available: January 1 through December 31, 2004
Agency:  Director of Central Intelligence
CRS-51
Legislative authority:  FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 721
Full text:   [http://www.dni.gov/reports/2004_unclass_report_to_NIC_DO_
16Nov04.pdf]
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (annual report)
Most recent date available:  March 2007
Agency:  U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Matters
Legislative authority: Section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended (the “FAA,” 22 U.S.C. §  2291);  sections 481(d)(2) and 484(c) of
the FAA; and section 804 of the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1974, as
amended).  Also provides the factual basis for designations in the President’s
report to Congress on major drug-transit or major illicit drug producing
countries pursuant to P.L. 107-115, the Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2002, Section 591
Full text Volume I: [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81446.pdf]
Full text Volume II:  [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81447.pdf]
Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance (annual report)
Most recent date available:  December 11, 2007
Agency:  United States Trade Representative
Legislative authority:  P.L. 106-186, the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000,
authorizing extension of Permanent Normal Trade Relations to the PRC,
Section 421
Full text: [http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/
2007/asset_upload_file625_13692.pdf
Report Monitoring to Congress on Implementation of the 1979 U.S.-PRC
Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology (biannual report) 
Most recent date available:  April 15, 2005 
Agency: U.S. Department of State, Office of Science and Technology Cooperation
Legislative Authority:  P.L. 107-314, Bob Stump National Defense Authorization
Act Section for FY2003, Section 1207
Full text:  [http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/44681.htm]
Report on Tibet Negotiations (annual report)
Most recent date available: June 2007
Agency:  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Legislative Authority:  P.L. 107-228, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003,
Section 613
Full text:  [http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/2007/88157.htm] 
Congressional-Executive Commission Report (annual report)
Most recent date available: October 10, 2007
Agency: Congressional-Executive Commission on China 
Legislative Authority: P.L. 106-286, Normal Trade Relations with the People’s
Republic of China, 2000
Full text: 
[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearin
gs&docid=f:38026.pdf]
